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REDEEMING THE WELSHED
GUARANTEE: A SCHEME FOR
ACHIEVING JUSTICIABILITY
ETHAN J. LEIB

I. INTRODUCTION
I am scavenging here.1 The feast of the republican revival in the
law reviews is long over, 2 and one is more likely to encounter a
commemorative symposium upon the anniversary of its death than a
celebration of its continued vitality in legal scholarship. But I have
* Law Clerk designate, the Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. B.A., Yale; M. Phil, Cambridge; M.A.,
Yale; J.D./Ph.D Candidate, Yale. I wish to thank Bruce Ackerman, David Mayhew,
David Cameron, and Daniel Doherty for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. See Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 Yale L. J. 1591, 1591 (1988)
(noting that "[l]egal scholars are natural scavengers").
2. For two oft cited articles heralding the republican revival in the law schools, see
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L. J. 1493 (1988); Cass Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L. J. 1539 (1988).
3. See generally Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L. J. 1493
(1988) (addressing objections to recent proposals to reconsider constitutionalism in
light of "civil republicanism," a theoretical approach that emphasizes political equality,
participation in government, and a variety of republican values); Symposium, Roads
Not Taken: Undercurrentsof Republican Thinking in Modern ConstitutionalTheory,
84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1989) (exploring contemporary constitutional understanding in
light of the historical dialogue between Federalists and Anti-federalists); Anthony E.
Cook, Forward: The Postmodern Quest for Community: An Introduction to a
Symposium on Republicanism and Voting Rights, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 409 (1989) (assessing
the differences between republicanism and liberalism); G. Edward White, Reflections
on the "Republican Revival": InterdisciplinaryScholarship in the Legal Academy, 6
Yale J. L. & Human. 1 (1994). For a historical account of the revival, White
recommends a look at Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretative Turn,
1992 Wis. L. Rev. 679 (June, 1992) (presenting "a confirmation of the 'familiar' status
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mined the discourse about republicanism for its oversights.
Investigation into its relationship with the Guarantee Clause, the one
place in the Constitution directly allocated to republicanism, 4 reveals
little attempted in the way of integration, largely because the Guarantee
Clause literature is even more dead than the republican revival
literature. 5
The Guarantee Clause has a history of "missed
of the republican revival among legal scholars").
4. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 [hereinafter "the Guarantee Clause"] (reading "[t]he
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government").
5. But see Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Conference on Constitutional Law.
Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 709 (1994)
(exploring which political actors and institutions are responsible for republican
government). There have been other creative attempts to make use of the Clause. E.g.
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J.
1, 18-19 (1971) (observing that the Guarantee Clause has not been neutrally applied to
the various values our society places on different rights); John Hart Ely, Democracy
and Distrust: A Theory of JudicialReview 118 (Harv. U. Press 1980) (exploring the
proposition that the Guarantee Clause requires that states hold popular elections);
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a
Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1988) (positing that "the states cannot enjoy
republican governments unless they retain sufficient autonomy to establish and
maintain their own forms of government"); James J. Seeley, The Public Referendum
and Minority Group Legislation: Postscriptto Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 Cornell L. Rev.
881, 905-10 (1970) (arguing that the referendum and republicanism are not necessarily
mutually exclusive); see e.g. Thomas C. Berg, The Guarantee of Republican
Government: Proposalsfor JudicialReview, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 208 (1987) (rejecting
per se nonjusticiability and urging judicial review of certain state action); Jay S. Bybee,
Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime, and the Forgotten
Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1997) (arguing that
the Guarantee Clause should not interfere with state criminal provisions, particularly
domestic violence statutes); John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud.- The Restoration
of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 427 (1998) (arguing that the
right to "honest service" from the government should be defined by independent
federal or state laws); Adam H. Kurland, The GuaranteeClause As a Basisfor Federal
Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 367 (1989) (viewing the
Guarantee Clause as conferring legislative power to deal with corrupt government
officials); Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 351 (1997) (comparing the Guarantee
Clause with the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Thomas A. Smith, Student Author,
The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the Guarantee Clause, 93
Yale L. J. 561 (1984) (interpreting the importance of the Guarantee Clause to
reapportionment cases); see generally e.g. Arthur E. Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New
Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 245
(1962); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause ofArticle IV, Section 4: A Study in
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1962) [hereinafter Bonfield,
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opportunities and might-have-beens. ' 6 In this article, I will try to
resuscitate both legal republicanism and the Guarantee Clause by
creating a lichen, where what is left of each can help the other thrive,
albeit parasitically.
This project is only possible because the legal literatures
addressing the republican revival and the Guarantee Clause make the
same fundamental error: They each fixate upon the possibilities for
judicial action. 7 Although the necessary corrective for the judgecentered nature of the republican revival has already been provided in a
series of comments and articles, 8 the tweak went too far in the opposite
direction, urging a primarily popular component to the inculcation of
civic virtue.
Quite rightly, this curative focused on the necessary
contribution of civil society to the attainment of the catalogue of
virtues republicans prize, emphasizing the help voluntary associations
can provide with breeding the substantive norms neo-republicanism
hopes to help germinate within the populace. 10 What got overlooked in
the scaling back of the emphasis upon judicial activism is what Jeremy
Waldron has called the "dignity of legislation." 1 1 Here, I reawaken the
naYve view that legislatures can sometimes embody what is good about
republicanism-deliberative processes, producing outcomes that public

Desuetude]; Charles 0. Lerche, The Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government
and the Admission of New States, I I J. Pol. 578 (1949).
6. William M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution 6 (Cornell
U. Press, 1972).
7. See Abrams, supra n. 1, at 1602 n. 50 (discussing the judge-centric nature of the
republican revival); M.N.S. Sellers, The Sacred Fire of Liberty 117-18 (N.Y.U. Press,
1998) (arguing that Michelman and Sunstein both leave the judiciary to do the work of
neo-republicanism). These arguments are given flesh infra at notes 10-18 and the
accompanying text.
8. See e.g. Abrams, supra n. 1; Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican
Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 Yale L. J. 1623, 1625 (1988) (noting that
"it is at least ironic that much of the legal scholarship of the republican revival, rather
than working to promote participation and discourse ... is as court-centered as the
pluralist scholarship from which it distinguishes itself').
9. Abrams, supra n. 1, at 1597.
10. See generally Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and
Government 246-70 (Oxford U. Press 1997); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The
Collapse and Revival of American Community 116-33 (Simon & Schuster 2000);
Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy
201-49 (Harv. U. Press 1996); Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity 8-10 (Harv.
U. Press 1991); Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity 25-29 (Anansi Press 1991).
11. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation 4-5 (Cambridge U. Press 1999).
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choice or courts might not. 12 Occasionally, legislative
deliberations
3
can be trusted without elaborate judicial policing.1
Most recently, liberal republicans have been forced to watch as
the Supreme Court has whittled away Congress's powers under both
the Commerce Clause, 14 as well as the Section Five Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 15 thereby neutralizing
Congress's most fruitful powers employed in service of progressive
legislation.16 In many of these recent cases, the neo-republicans would
probably like to say that Congress's activism was more in the spirit of
progressive republican ends than the very judicial activism for which

12. But see Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative
Democracy & American National Government 1-5, 150-80 (U. Chi. Press 1994)
(arguing that legislatures do indeed embody this feature of republicanism and that
deliberation explains their behavior in ways that other theories cannot); Arthur Maass,
Congress and the Common Good 13-18 (Basic Books, 1983) (employing a
"deliberative model" to investigate Congressional decision-making, particularly in
inter-Congressional contexts as well as Congressional-Executive relations). For a
review of this endeavor, see Keith Whittington, In Defense of Legislatures, 28 Pol.
Theory 690, 693-95 (2000); Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided
Powers and Constitutional Meaning 3 (Harv. U. Press 1999) (discussing the idea of
"constitutional constructions" and the entire "extra-judicial constitutional
interpretation" literature); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the
CongressionalProcess, and the Federalism Cases: An InterdisciplinaryCritique, Ill
Yale L. J. 1707, 1709 (2002). Frickey and Smith argue against the coherence of the
"due deliberation" model, where courts impose upon Congress procedural requirements
to produce "rational, articulated decision[s]." Id. The argument to follow here is not of
the "due deliberation" variety; here I argue that congressional action under the
Guarantee Clause should be considered nonjusticiable.
13. But see Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8-9 n. 8 (1996) (arguing against the approach
in Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986), and "insist[ing] that the principal vehicle" for
deliberative democracy and the inculcation of republican virtues "is the legislature, not
the judiciary"). Sunstein, however, still uses the Court "to play a catalytic and
supplementary role." Id. at 9 n. 8. While inter-branch dialogue and judicial help is a
nice ideal, the recent real-world federalism cases militate against thinking too hard
about how the Court can help; its doctrine must be used against it to site power
elsewhere.
14. U.S. Const. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 3.
15. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
16. See e.g. Bd of Trustees of the U. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000); U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
627 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); U.S. v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 568 (1995).
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they spent the 1980s fighting. 17 Given the current state of Commerce
Clause and Enforcement Clause jurisprudence, neo-republicans would
be well advised to shift their attention from the justification for judicial
action, to the justification for Congress to act in service of republican
ends (assuming, of course, that Congress uses that esteemed republican
process of deliberation). 1 8
Republicans have always trusted representatives for their capacity
to deliberate: James Madison wanted "to refine and enlarge the public
views by Jassing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens."
Alexander Hamilton saw the representative body as an
"opportunity for cool and sedate reflection." 2° To be sure, republicans
will always be suspicious when legislatures function on the interestgroup pluralist model; they will have an impulse to recruit the judicial
branch to enforce interest-free deliberation for the common good by a
group of trustees. 2 1 If the jurisprudence of the Guarantee Clause
teaches us anything, however, it is that the political branches of
government must have a say in defining what republicanism requires
for the polity. Republicans should encourage Congress to instantiate
its own ideas about republicanism through a legislative power-a
power that may be found in the Guarantee Clause. 22 Congress may
then be both helpful for the theory republicanism as well as a practical
means for the promotion of republican ends.

17.

Sellers, supra n. 7, at 119 (taking the somewhat cynical view is that the

"republican revival first developed in American law schools to provide a rationale for
judicial activism following President Reagan's re-election in 1984").
18. Frickey & Smith, supra n. 12, 1755-56 (arguing that deliberation is too much to
ask of legislatures and that judges cannot police it).
19. James Madison, The FederalistNo. X in The Federalist: A Commentary on the
Constitution of the United States vol. I, 62, 67 (Tudor Publg. 1937).

20. Alexander Hamilton, The FederalistNo. LXXI, supra n. 19, at vol. II, 59, 60.
21. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L.

Rev. 1689, 1730 (1984).
22. While an exhaustive treatment of the subject would include attention to the way
another political branch, the Executive, might utilize the power of the Guarantee
Clause and republicanism, I generally limit my discussion here to Congress. It is, after
all, Congress that is currently experiencing diminished capacities owing to a Court that
is insistently divesting it of constitutional powers. Moreover, as I argue in Part III,
Congress is a most appropriate site for debates about republicanism. For one historical
example of a President considering his powers under the Guarantee Clause, see
Kurland, supra n. 5, at 448-49.
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On a similar note, theorists of the Guarantee Clause have also
been too invested in making arguments for when and how the judiciary
ought to enforce the Clause and render it justiciable; they are
concerned with the judiciary being a site for and promoter of
republicanism's agenda. In large measure, I am sympathetic to many
of the arguments for the Clause's justiciability. The power of judicial
review should indeed extend into the domain of some "political
questions, ' 2 3 and there is little virtue in too much passivity-especially
once the polity grants the need for counter-majoritarian judicial review
in a liberal constitutionalist regime. 24 If a court wants to show
deference to a political branch, there is no intuitive reason why
jurisdiction should be denied. Instead, the Court can grant jurisdiction
and just defer, as the Court will occasionally do, especially in military
matters. 2 5 But I suspect that the Court's 150-year-old commitment to
nonjusticiability will not succumb to the urges of a few law review
articles.
Thus, embedded in my suggestion that Congress re-pass its
progressive legislation under the jurisdictional basis of its Guarantee
Clause power, is the realism the Court will react with hostility.
Nonetheless, the general scheme here is aimed to achieve justiciability
through the back door. If Congress were to exercise the powers that
the Court generally indicates are rightfully its own under the Guarantee
Clause, the Court would likely be encouraged to tailor a jurisprudence
23. Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 Yale L. J. 597,
625 (1976); Martin Redish, JudicialReview and the 'PoliticalQuestion,' 79 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1031, 1033 (1985); see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall
of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine and the Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 Colum. L.

Rev. 237, 239-41 (2002); Martin H. Redish, The FederalCourts in the PoliticalOrder:
Judicial Jurisdiction and American Political Theory 111-35 (Carolina Acad. Press
1991) [hereinafter Redish, Federal Courts]. Redish argues "the political question
doctrine should play no role whatsoever in the exercise of the judicial review power."
Id. at 112.
24. But see Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword. The
Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 43 (1961) (enumerating the court's passive
virtues); Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics 111-98 (Yale U. Press 1962) [hereinafter Bickel, Least Dangerous]
(devoting a chapter to the passive virtues).
25. See e.g. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67-69 (1981) (deferring to a military
policy that discriminates against women); Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 217-18
(1944) (deferring to the wartime internment of Japanese-Americans). Though these
cases may be viewed as achieving unfortunate results, it is hard to imagine that it
would be preferable for the Court to show cowardice by denying justiciability.
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of the Guarantee Clause. Theorists of the Clause have been urging this
for decades. When the Court is confronted with congressional
legislation under a new power, we should expect that the Court will
make, even if it cannot find, "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards," precisely what it has denied is possible in26 "political
questions" raised in challenges under the Guarantee Clause.
The approach of this article is a scheme, in every sense of the
word. While arguments for justiciability continue to be made, a
pragmatic way to achieve it has not been spelled out. Part II will lay
out versions of republicanism I hope to see discussed in the context of
the Guarantee Clause. Part III will explore republicanism's excessive
attention on the courts, recommending the aforementioned approach of
Jeremy Waldron. Part IV will briefly suggest how some of the
legislation recently curtailed by the Supreme Court might be justified
under a theory of legislative, as opposed to court-centered,
republicanism. Part V will show how the fixation on justiciability in
the Guarantee Clause discourse is misdirected, making the same error
as the republican revival. Part VI will address why the Guarantee
Clause is a hopeful place to look for congressional authority to enact
republican ends; the argument is, based on the Clause's history in the
courts as well as in Congress. The Conclusion will make clearer the
point of this approach to republicanism and the Guarantee Clause: By
refocusing energy to give Congress some powers under the Clause,
progressives can send a much stronger message to the courts to
discover and manage a Guarantee Clause jurisprudence. To be sure,
many may be disappointed by some of the results; but at least we'll
achieve justiciability, and a limited power for legislatures to define
republicanism and what it requires.
II. REPUBLICANISM'S DISCONTENT
Republicanism's greatest embarrassment-but what may be one
of its greatest assets-is its incapacity to settle on a consistent agenda.
Cass Sunstein was honest about the project of the republican revival
from the outset: "The task for modem republicanism is not.., one of
excavation. Contemporary republicanism is more to be made than
found, even if historical commitments can illuminate, in somewhat
surprising ways, the nature of American constitutionalism at its

26. Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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inception." 2 7 What started as a project inspired by the school of
historiography, 28 became-when appropriated by legal scavengers-a
flourishing field that owed surprisingly little to historical accounts of
what republicanism meant at the Founding. This led to a series of
complaints. H. Jefferson Powell notes:
Modem republicanism, it seems, is interested only in those parts
of the language of the past that it can appropriate. Professor
Sunstein does not offer us historical republicanism and commend
theory and
its virtues to us; he offers us a contemporary political
29
notes that at times the founders said similar things.
But this is hardly something to be ashamed of; it is in the very
nature of republicanism to contest what republicanism requires, to
"alter and abolish" meanings, as The Federalist's authors had it.
Michelman suggests that republicanism's "expression of... American
constitutionalism's problematic and dynamic core [is] its endless
interplay between the principles of legality (entailing respect for
historical commitment) and self-government (entailing respect for the
human capacity for self-renewal)." 30 One of republicanism's legacies,
then, is its commitment to change its own self-description.
This progressive packaging shouldn't be read to downplay
republicanism's roots in a classical tradition that is downright offensive
to many who celebrate the revival of republican discourse. Linda
Kerber warns enthusiasts: "Patriarchy was comfortably compatible
27. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1589.
28. The central texts of this school include: Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New
Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790's (N.Y.U. Press 1984); Bernard
Bailyn, The Central Themes of the American Revolution. An Interpretation in Essays
on the American Revolution 3 (Stephen G. Kurtz & James H. Hutson eds., 1973);
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Harv. U. Press
Press 1967); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral
Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (U. Chi. Press 1988)
(discussing the history and future of republicanism, and its plasticity); J.G.A. Pocock,
The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican
Tradition (Princeton U. Press 1975) (discussing the revival of republicanism in Puritan
England); Robert Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39
Win. & Mary Q. 334 (1982); Robert Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The
Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29
Win. & Mary Q. 49 (1972); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787 (U.N.C. Press 1969).
29. H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 Yale L. J. 1703, 1707 (1988).
30. Michelman, supra n. 2, at 1518.
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with classical republicanism... . Slavery, too, was comfortably
compatible with classical republicanism, and for many of the same
reasons." 3 1 But even Sunstein acknowledges that "[v]arious strategies
of exclusion.., were built into the republican tradition.
The
republican belief in deliberation about the common good was closely
tied to these practices of exclusion; it cannot be neatly separated from
them. ' 32 Neo-republicanism's proponents knew that they were up
against an oftentimes unflattering history, but still felt that the ideology
could be recruited for very important purposes.
A. DELIBERATION

As discussed in the Introduction, among the most central of these
purposes was the belief in deliberation. Consider de Tocqueville:
What is meant by "republic" in the United States is the slow and
quiet action of society upon itself. It is an orderly state really
founded on the enlightened will of the people. It is a conciliatory
government under which resolutions have time to ripen,3 3being
discussed with deliberation and executed only when mature.
The centrality of deliberation for neo-republicans, however, "is
aspirational and critical rather than celebratory and descriptive. It is a
basis for evaluating political practices." 34 By assessing the degree to
which a policy is derived from deliberative procedures, republicans
purport to be able to pass judgment on the legitimacy of governmental
action. Largely in response to what they find repugnant in the interestgroup pluralist tradition, republicans "attempt to design political
institutions that promote discussion and debate among the citizenry;
they will be hostile to systems that promote lawmaking as 'deals' or
bargains among self-interested private groups; they may well attempt
to insulate political actors from private pressure." 5 This is generally
31. Linda K. Kerber, The Republican Civil Tradition: Making Republicanism
Useful, 97 Yale L. J. 1663, 1668 (1988).
32. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1539.
33. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 395 (J. P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969).
34. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1549; but see Frickey & Smith, supra n. 12 (arguing that
it cannot be a basis for evaluating political practices).
35. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1549; see Michelman, supra n. 2, at 1507-08; but see
Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flightfrom Substance, 97 Yale L.
J. 1633, 1636-39 (1988); Ethan J. Leib, Towards a Practice of Deliberative
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accomplished with an impulse in republicanism to sing the praises of
participatory democracy. 6 By increasing the number of participants,
government can be more responsive to popular demands, and not pay
attention merely to powerful private interests.
While deliberation and participation are their primary procedural
concerns, neo-republicans have some substantive concerns as well.
The trouble with focusing on such matters is that-as Kerber has
observed-" 'Republicanism' has become so all-embracing as to
absorb comfortably its own contradictions." 37 Nonetheless, there are
some themes that recur often enough to associate them with the
"essence" of republicanism, notwithstanding the fact that "[t]o insist on
the 'essence' of republicanism ha[s] the effect of driving the term
republican into the realm of metaphor and uncertainty, making it
vulnerable to a host of alternate and conflicting definitions. '' 38 Kerber
continues to suggest that such reification of the term renders it
"available to signify almost anything so long as it was
nonmonarchical." 39 But in the years following the revival, a broad
array of substantive norms can be traced, in the literature, rendering the
ideology more determinate-and perhaps more progressive-than its
classical formulation.
B. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS DEMOCRA TIC EGALITARIANISM

For Akhil Amar, the "central pillar of [r]epublican
[g]ovemment... is popular sovereignty.' 40 Amar believes such a
redescription absorbs the concepts of majoritarian rule and

Democracy: A Proposalfor a PopularBranch, 33 Rutgers L.J. 359 (2002) (attempting
to fill the gap). It should be noted that very few institutional design projects emerge
from the theoretical enterprise.
36. See e.g. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: ParticipatoryPoliticsfor a New
Age xiv (U. Cal. Press 1984); Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy 3
(Basic Books 1980); see generally Carole Pateman, Participationand Democratic
Theory (Cambridge U. Press 1970) (discussing recent theories of democracy and trends
toward democratic self-management in industry).
37. Linda K. Kerber, The Republican Ideology of the Revolutionary Generation,37
Am. Q. 474, 480 (1985).
38. Id.at 477.
39. Id.
40. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749,
749 (1994).
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representative democracy into the idea of republicanism. His argument
draws upon The Federalistto show that "republican government was
regularly contradistinguished from monarchy and aristocracy, but
rarely from democracy," indicating that republicanism carries with 4it1
some properties of majoritarian and representative democracy.
Indeed, the guarantee of a republican form of government explicitly
was meant to give the "superintending government" the "authority to
42
defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations."
Republican government, on the Federalist model, is "a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body
of the people.., not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored
class of it." 4 3 Madison further proved "the republican complexion" of
the Constitution in a "decisive" fashion, noting the "absolute
prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State
governments." 44 These Madisonian pronouncements lend credibility to
Amar's popular sovereignty thesis.
Moreover, Amar sees in republicanism a certain flexibility,
suggesting that "[r]epublican government probably does not (as some
have claimed) prohibit all forms of direct democracy, such as initiative
and referendum, but neither does it require ordinary lawmaking via
these direct populist mechanisms." 45 This flexibility makes the theory
fit "quite snugly" with modern practices of mixing direct and
representative democracy, 4 6 and therefore, has immediate appeal for
those pointing4 7to neo-republicanism as a descriptive account of our
mixed regime.
But the inherent vagueness of the term republicanism is not aided
by the equally vague notion of popular sovereignty: In republicanism,

41. Id. at 758.
42. James Madison, The FederalistNo. XLII, supra n. 19, at vol. 1, 294, 297.
43. James Madison, The FederalistNo. XXXIX, supra n. 19, vol. 1, 257.

44. Id. at 259.
45. Amar, supra n. 40, at 749.
46. Id. at 762. It is notable that Amar is seemingly more interested in a
republicanism that is a "snug fit" with his theory about the Bill of Rights, than with
democracy itself. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creationand
Reconstruction (Yale U. Press 1998) (arguing that the Bill of Rights' present
interpretation owes more to the Reconstruction era than the Founding).
47. Amar, supra n. 40, at 758 (claiming that "other leading Framers seemed
explicitly to say that republican government could be either directly or indirectly
democratic"). But his emphasis on democracy surely seems overblown.
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as in popular sovereignty, scholars are always interested in-and
receive little guidance to figure out-just who the relevant "we the
people" are who should rule or be represented. Thus, for those who
want to look to republicanism for normative grounding, Amar proffers
little to specify its substantive norms.
Even as an historical account, Amar's theses are overstated. It is
beyond dispute that classical republicanism's main strain was
aristocratic, and that the Framers inherited much of this orientation.
Charles Pinckney thought the president should be very wealthy, and it
was quite common to have an anti-popular thrust to political thinking at
the Founding. 48 Only William Few of Georgia represented the lower
Hamilton "candidly
class at the Constitutional Convention. 4 9
50
And although George Mason and James
disdained the people."
Madison appealed to the genius of the people, Jeremy Belknap noted,
"[l]et it stand as a principle that government originates from the people;
but let the people be taught.., that they are not fit to govern
themselves." 52 These proclivities led republicanism to be associated
primarily with representative government. In the most authoritative
statement by Madison, a republic is defined as "a government in which
the scheme of representation takes place.",53 Amar's feeble attempt to
discredit the Madisonian definition by emphasizing Madison's
55
hesitance, 54 supposedly embodied in the words "by which I mean,"
borders on the absurd. Madison uses this type of locution two other
times in the very FederalistX to which Amar turns for support. In his
discussion of "pure democracy, ' 56 Madison uses the refrain "by which
I mean;" 5 7 and in defining "faction," 58 he writes, "[b]y a faction I

48. Richard Hofstader, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It

4 (Alfred A. Knopf 1989).
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. (Notice too that no one thought that the more populist house, the House of
Representative, should have income ceilings, over which members were thought too
rich to truly represent their constituents).
5 I. Id. at 6-7.
52. Id. (quoting an un-cited letter from New England clergyman Jeremy Belknap to
a friend).
53. Madison, The Federalist No. X, supra n. 19, at vol. I, 67.
54. Amar, supra n. 40, at 757.
55. Madison, The Federalist No. X, supra n. 19, at vol. 1, 67.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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understand ....
In neither of these other cases is there a hint that
Madison's definition of these concepts was idiosyncratic, and there is
no reason to suggest that is the case with his definition of
republicanism.
It would be hard to deny that "[r]epublicanism could be
comfortably congruent with aristocracy; it certainly was expected that
the citizen had enough property to free himself to find his fulfillment in
serving the public good.
After all, as scholars have urged:
Historically, the granting of the franchise has been contingent on
the freehold. Individuals not having the luxury of material
independence have been viewed as "corrupt"; because such
individuals are subject to the will of another for existence,
republican theory62has held them to be incapable of abstracted,
normative reason.
It suffices for Michelman (and Amar) that "Madison and his
fellow federalists 'agreed, explicitly, that the people could create, alter,
or abolish their government whenever they chose to do so,' and that
they did so by way of concession to the country's prevailing
democratic-republican sentiment." 63
But even Michelman cites
Professor Miller, who argues that this concession was rhetorical at best,
an argument that goes a long way toward undermining Amar's
position. Michelman, invoking Miller, continues:
[F]or the acts of "the people" to be valid, they had to act all at
once and together. Thus the Federalists rendered the democratic
vocabulary of popular sovereignty harmless by invoking a
fictitious people who could not possibly act together. The
Federalists ascribed all power to a mythical entity that could never

58. Id. at 63.
59. Id.
60. But see M.N.S. Sellers, American Republicanism 151 (N.Y.U. Press 1994)

(noting that John Adams observed that using republic to mean representative
democracy is only "peculiar" to some English and French writers).
61. Kerber, supra n. 37, at 479 (citing Pocock, supra n. 28, at 507).
62. Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97
Yale L. J.1609, 1612 n.12 (1988) (citing J.G.A. Pocock, Civic Humanism and Its Role
in Anglo-American Thought in Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political

Thought and History 80, 87-89 (U. Chi. Press 1989)).
63. Michelman, supra n. 2, at 1537 n.23.
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meet, never
deliberate, never take action. The body politic became
64
a ghost.
It was not accidental that the class of persons whose deliberations
were worth heeding, was always confined. 65 The authors of The
Federalist,while explicitly condemning nobility, condoned the nobility
that republican government afforded them, even without titles of
66
nobility.
This historical reality, however, never gets in the way of
republicans making egalitarian pronouncements. Consider Sunstein:
"Dramatic differences in wealth and power are ...

inconsistent with

the underlying premises of a republican polity. Montesquieu was
particularly insistent on this point, envisioning equality as a necessary
precondition for republicanism. ' '6 7 But at least Sunstein is clear that
history is not univocal; and that while neo-republicanism aspires to
some redistributive programs, such an orientation is best seen as
something to make for history, not find therein.
C. THE VIRTUE OF COMMON GOODS

M.N.S. Sellers believes that popular sovereignty is a value
posterior to what is central about republicanism. "Republicanism came
first: [T]he idea that government exists for the common good of the
people. Popular sovereignty followed, as the best test of the public
good. ' ' 8 Although noting rather typically that the term "continue[s] to
69
attract new meanings, in pursuit of various legal and political goals,"
Sellers draws our attention to a primary good of the republicans; they
inherit from Montesquieu the instinct to prize self-sacrificing virtue
70
and glorify civic participation used in service of the common good.
This "Common Good Thesis," as Amar calls it, is defined by

64. Id. (citing Joshua Miller, The Ghostly Body Politic: The FederalistPapersand
PopularSovereignty, 16 Pol. Theory 99, 104 (1988)).
65. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1590 n. 109.
66. Pangle, supra n. 28, at 124.
67. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1552 (citing Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu,
The Spirit of the Laws vol. 1, 43-45 (J.V. Pritchard ed., Thomas Nugent, trans.,
Rothman & Co. 1991).
68. Sellers, supra n. 7, at 99.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 99-100; see Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws
43-47 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Rothman & Co. 1991).
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republicanism's aim that "virtuous citizens be willing to make
sacrifices for the greater common good.",7 1 By emphasizing that
republicanism historically favored such a commitment to the common
good, neo-republicans could assert that "clauses of the United States
Constitution exist, on this argument, largely to prevent private interests
from exercising undue influence on public policy." 72 It is clearly part
of republicanism's rhetoric to encompass "terms
such as 'the common
73
good,' . . . and 'public-regarding' activity."
Of course, as with many of the other substantive norms of
republicanism, just what is to count as a public good is largely
indeterminate: "As Gordon Wood has observed, under this definition, it
would even be possible for a hereditary monarchy to be a republic, 74
if
spirit."
virtuous
self-sacrificing,
proper
the
possessed
its citizens
Although some have argued that the Federalists specifically departed
from this inheritance of republicanism's definition from
Montesquieu, 7 5 the rhetoric 7of
the common good may be viewed as
6
useful, even if indeterminate.
D. STRUCTURAL PREFERENCES

Though republicanism appears consistent with non-democratic
regimes at the level of theory, neo-republicanism embeds within its
preferences specific governmental structures, articulated neatly by
Sellers. When listing his "catalogue" of republican virtues, he
prioritizes:
(1) [P]ursuit of the common good through[;] (2) popular
sovereignty... ; (3) the rule of law, under[;] (4) a mixed and
balanced government, comprising[;] (5) a deliberative senate[;] (6)
an elected executive[;] and[,] (7) a popular assembly or
representative lower house in the legislature./
71. Amar, supra n. 40, at 759.
72. Sellers, supra n. 7, at 117 (citing Sunstein, supra n. 21, at 1683-732).

73. White, supra n. 3, at 21.
74. Amar, supra n. 40, at 759 (citing Wood, supra n. 28, at 49, 205-06).
75. E.g. David Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist 124 (U. Chi. Press
1984).
76. See Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 146 (2d ed., U.

Notre Dame Press 1981) (arguing that these common goods are quite determinate
despite radical moral disagreement).
77. Sellers, supra n. 7, at 99 (citing Sellers, supra n. 60, at 6, 245).
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His placement of the institutional structures toward the bottom of
the list might be unfortunate. Such a ranking downplays the role of
governmental organization; a different mode of ordering the virtues
would highlight the fact that four of seven are institutional and
determinate, while the other three are so abstract as to stand for
virtually anything.
However, Sellers' depiction is, of course, distinctly (and
intentionally) American, and the revivalists (while particularly
sensitive to the American political scene) hardly want to be so
parochial as to insist on the particular separation and balance of powers
the American Constitution devised. Some parliamentary regimeseven those without judicial review-must embody the substantive
norms of the ideology. Thus such a perspective would render
revivalists narrow-minded,
with too much fixation on particular
78
organizational norms.
That said, there is something to Sellers' articulation. Modem
republicans like mixed regimes to balance power, even if they
ultimately spend too much time tailoring their theories for judicial and
popular implementation. They like to imagine a deliberative body
making policy decisions, even if they are so skeptical of deliberation at
the legislative level that they look to enforce such deliberation from
without. 79 Furthermore, they like to include some degree of popular
input by romanticizing the electoral process, even if they suspect that
high degrees of voter ignorance cast a cloud of illegitimacy over all
electoral politics.
Republicans want to take up projects of
institutional design, because they see a necessar relation between the
health of a polity and its institutional integrity.
Nevertheless, they
will of course, differ on just what kinds of institutional reforms are
needed, and different republics will need different institutions, owing
to their entrenched cultural norms.

78. As we shall see infra notes 141-61 and accompanying text, the focus on the
judiciary is a symptom of this pathology.
79. E.g. Redish, Federal Courts, supra n. 23, at 24-25.
80. E.g. Epstein, supra n. 75, at 22-26.
81. E.g. Pettit, supran. 10, at 271-81.
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E. NON-DOMINATION
One of the more recent attempts to spell out a theory of what is
central to republicanism can be found in Philip Pettit's Republicanism.
He is quite hopeful about this theory's broad appeal, stating:
Republican theory should recommend itself to all competitors, I
believe, in the axiom from which it starts. The republican
conception of liberty should appeal to liberals, in so far as it
focuses on people's individual power of choice and thus has much
in common with the negative notion of freedom as noninterference. And it should appeal to populists in so far as it
requires.., that non-dominating government has to track the
interests and ideas of ordinary people; this is the idea that lies
behind the2 positive, populist notion of freedom as democratic self8
mastery.
For Pettit, the ideal of non-domination is what holds
republicanism together and is the prerequisite for the public
participation it valorizes. 83 The ideal "requires that no one is able to
interfere on an arbitrary basis-at their pleasure-in the choices of a
free person. ' 84 What this means is that more than-and perhaps
slightly less than-people's first order freedoms are protected.
"[D]omination in the sense defined may occur without actual
interference: [I]t requires only the capacity for interference; and
interference may occur without any domination: [I]f the interference is
not arbitrary then it will not dominate." 85 Pettit's hope is that such
non-domination will lead to autonomy for all citizens in a republican
regime. 86 He is again hopeful about this project because he believes
87
that "most people are naturally responsive to legitimate demands."
Pettit explains:
When someone enjoys non-domination that will usually be a
matter of common knowledge among relevant parties, so that non-

82. Id.at 11.
83. Id. Unfortunately, many have severed the means of non-domination and
participation from the end it is supposed to serve. The result really is foreign to any
faithful attempt to get republicanism right.
84. ld.at 271.
85. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 279. I'm not quite as optimistic.
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domination has a subjective and intersubjective aspect: [l]t is
associated with tranquillity, in Montesquieu's phrase, and with the
ability to look others in the eye.88
Although Pettit never cites Catherine MacKinnon, his nondomination approach bears some resemblance to her approach toward
89
Equal Protection jurisprudence and its sensitivity to domination.
Pettit capitalizes upon what Kerber already knows, that "[t]reating
republicanism as a cultural as well as political phenomenon opens the
way to evaluating" its import in different ways. By using a term such
as domination, with all of its cultural baggage, Pettit is able to extend
republicanism's ambit into a sphere not directly political. Thus, his
attention to republicanism's communitarianism is not accidental.
"Freedom as non-domination is a communitarian good. It can be
realized only under an arrangement involving people in communal
interaction."
By tying republicanism to its dependence on a
contribution from civil society, Pettit adroitly disentangles the health of
the polity from a pathologically monolithic obsession with
governmental structures. Moreover, he is given an escape hatch to
avoid focus on the judiciary, a problem that resurfaces in the republican
revival time and again.
That said, he probably doesn't give
institutional design enough attention, leaving republicanism with little
ammunition to establish its values.
The greatest disadvantage of Pettit's theory is its unbounded
optimism. But it has a lot going for it that other contenders do not.
First, it does not need to rely on any reading of the Federalists. Pettit
isn't American, so he has no particular need to theorize from an

88. Id. at 273.
89. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law 40-43 (Harv. U. Press 1988) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminism]; Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination
102 (Yale U. Press 1986). Of course, MacKinnon and Pettit take aim at different
targets and the opposites of their theories are quite different. MacKinnon wants to
overcome the "difference approach" to gender inequalities and Pettit wants to
overcome "negative" liberty's hold on the liberal imagination. MacKinnon, Feminism,
at 33; Pettit, supra n. 10, at 27. Yet, they end up with a similar result, and it is quite
surprising for Pettit, throughout his book, to ignore a central theorist of domination.
90. Kerber, supra n. 37, at 482-83 (paying particular attention to the cultural effect
of republicanism upon women). White suggests that this "cultural turn" was endemic
to the republican revival. White, supra n. 3, at 10.
91. Pettit, supra n. 10, at 275.
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American foundation. 92 This is helpful if only because it does away
with the constraint of being answerable to history and allows him to
focus primarily on what republicanism can do for us today. Sunstein
and Michelman had progressive hopes too, but felt the need to show
republicanism's continuity
with the story that was being told about it in
93
literature.
historical
the
Another great advantage of Pettit's version is its explicitly opentextured quality.
As he suggests, "republicanism is a research
[program] for policy-making, not a once-for-always blueprint." 94 In
his emphasis on non-domination, Pettit makes clear that "the important
thing to ensure is that governmental doings are fit to survive popular
contestation." 95 His substantive norm, then, translates into a more
proceduralist agenda. "This contestatory conception of democracy has
priority over the accounts given of likely republican aims, and likely
constitutionalist constraints, in the sense that those accounts should be
seen as outlines of what is likely to pass muster in a contestatory
democracy. ' 96 By making explicit that "on any plausible republican
view, preferred policy should be implemented by the state only in ways
that conform to preferred process," Pettit lets us see virtually all of
republicanism's substantive norms as emerging from contestation, and
for that very reason open to change.
Contestation, as part of the deliberative process, relies on certain
intellectual virtues, with which republicanism has historically been
linked. Pettit, without exploring this tradition explicitly, makes
overtures to republicanism's "foregrounding of reason," in
contradistinction to the "backgrounded" reason of interest-group
pluralism. 97 Though we'll have to leave the investigation of Reason
for another time, it suffices to use this opportunity to transition into a
more general discussion of republicanism's consistent orientation
toward the inculcation of the intellectual virtues.

92. Of course, if he stays in the States too long, all that might change; but I imagine
Brian Barry, Maurizio Viroli, and Jeremy Waldron will encourage him not to give in to
the temptation.
93. See Michelman, supra n. 2, at 1494-95; Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1535-40.
94. Pettit, supra n. 10, at 276.

95. Id. at 277.
96. Id. at 278.
97. Id.
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F. THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

Given republicanism's emphasis on certain capacities to facilitate
deliberative outcomes, it should not be surprising that there are
qualities of mind and character that republicanism must insist upon for
proper effectuation. Although such attention to intellectual virtues can
be seen as snobby and elitist, neo-republicanism has nonetheless
embraced this aspiration-albeit dressed in more populist garb. Even
Madison and Mason appealed to the genius of the people. 9 8 Thomas
Pangle puts it this way: "Wherever the genuine classical republican
tradition still lives, there is some agreement as to the supreme value of
the intellectual virtues, and of a life spent in leisured meditation on the
nature of justice, the soul, and divinity." 99 Although we have all
moved past the classical form, there is surely a heritage that lives on in
the modem incarnation.
Of the recent attempts to show revolutionary America as
committed to an "informed citizenry," Richard Brown's is the most
prominent. 1°° He notes that an "uncensored, competitive press, a
nationally subsidized postal service and transportation networks ... are

all founded on the belief that America must have an informed
citizenry."''1 1 By emphasizing the extent to which such priorities
surfaced at the Founding, Brown is able to highlight the organizing
theme of such priorities. In particular, he argues that the enshrined
First Amendment rights to free speech and a free press were aimed at
inculcating an informed citizenry to avoid the problems of other
republics; 102 the Framers were aware that other republics had not been
durable. Brown hypothesizes that an informed citizenry would combat
that insecurity, and that the formula for American republicanism
included such intellectual aspirations.103
Brown notes that in the minds of the framers, the "age of reading"
was to ensure the goodness of the republic. 104 Madison wanted to keep
98. For further discussion of Madison and Mason, see supra notes 51-60, and
accompanying text.
99. Pangle, supra n. 28, at 61.
100. See Richard D. Brown, The Strength of a People: The Idea of an Informed

Citizenry in America, 1650-1870 xi (U.N.C. Press 1996).

101. Id. at xvi.
102. Id. at 85-86.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 115.
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postal rates-at least for newspapers-low, "since anything 'above half
a cent, amounted to a prohibition ...of the distribution of knowledge
and information.' "105 Jefferson wanted no juror or voter to be certified
without having shown proficiency in reading, writing, and
arithmetic. 106

Furthermore, "a Vermont Jeffersonian had tersely

explained that 'knowledge is the standing army of republics.' "107
10 8

Even the Anti-federalist governor of New York, George Clinton,
urged in 1792 that "the diffusion of knowledge
is essential to the
1
promotion of virtue and preservation of liberty."' 9
In service of this goal of an informed citizenry, many state
constitutions and bills of rights enshrined the virtues of public
education. 110 Although even Brown v. Board of Education did not put
a similar commitment to public education into the federal system,' I
the general hope for the broad inculcation of the intellectual virtues
was very much part of the debates at the Founding. Led by Madison
and Pinckney, the Framers almost wrote a Federal University into the
Constitution. 1 12
Ben Rush took up the argument:
"[I]n this

105. Id. at 91 (citing Papers of James Madison (Congressional)vol. 14, 186 (Robert
A. Rutland & Thomas A. Mason eds., U. of Va. Press 1983)).
106. Id. at 94.
107. Id. at 117 (citing O.C. Merrill, The Happiness of America: An Oration
Deliveredat Shaftesbury, Vermont 13 (1804)).
108. Compare Wood, supra n. 28, at 499-500 (finding the Anti-federalists to be the
main proponents of classical republicanism) with Kerber, supra n. 31, at 1666. Kerber
provides a corrective, stating:
The entire revolutionary generation, both Federalists and Antifederalists,
were heirs of the classical republican tradition. If there is much in
Antifederalist ideology which conveys the republican tradition-especially
its emphasis on small scale politics and intense citizen participation-there is
also a great deal, perhaps even more, in Federalist ideology which also
embodies republican tradition, including an intense consciousness of the
fragility of republics, of the natural inequality of the social classes, and of the
threat to virtue posed by ambition, luxury and lust.
Id.
109. Brown, supra n. 100, at 103-04.
110. Id. at 85-86; see EdgewoodIndep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tx.
1989) (finding the state constitution to require better allocation of state educational
resources to the poor, thus providing what the federal constitution cannot); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1973).
111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. Pangle, supra n. 28, at 76 (citing The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787 321-22, 325, 616, 620 (Max Farrand ed., Yale U. Press 1966).
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University ...prepare our youth for civil and public life." 1 13 Thus,
students should study political science first and foremost. Jefferson
jumped aboard with Washington and Madison, but then focused his
energy primarily on the state outlet, the University of Virginia.
Jefferson, in his Preamble to a Bill for the More General Diffusion of
Knowledge, wrote:
[I]t becomes expedient for promoting the public happiness that
those persons, whom nature hath endowed with genius and virtue,
should be rendered by liberal education worthy to receive, and
able to guard the sacred deposit of the rights and liberties of their
fellow citizens. 114
George Washington was also willing to commit his own cash to
the national university:
Wartime experience had convinced Washington that mixing
together "young men from different parts of the United States"
which one
caused them to shed "those jealousies and prejudices[]
1
part of the Union had imbibed against another part." "r
Nevertheless, no explicit guarantee of public education (or
commitment to diversity for its capacity to shed prejudice) was ever
inscribed into the document-but they did ultimately agree to
guarantee a republican form of government, which was simply
unimaginable without education.
In looking more closely at Jefferson's articulation, we can easily
see that education was not important because it could impart to just
anyone the intellectual virtues, or because it could provide a
mechanism for social mobility. One needed to be predisposed-or
"habituated," as Aristotle has been translated-to leadership and
intellectuality to make an education worth the investment. The
national university was to be a breeding ground for those from the
political class. Nevertheless, the historical commitment to education is
one that still provides modem republicans with pride.

113. Id. (citing American Higher Education: A Documentary History 152-57
(Richard Hofstader & Wilson Smith eds., U. Chi. Press 1961)).
114. Id. at 77 (citing Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, The Founders' Constitution
672 (U. Chi. Press 1986)).
115. Brown, supra n. 100, at 95 (citing George Washington, Writings of George
Washington vol. 35, 199 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., Govt. Printing Off. 1940)).
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One of the underlying purposes of education was to have reason
take its proper place in politics. "It is the reason, alone of the public,
that ought to control and regulate the government." 6 By using
education to help people control their passions, republicans facilitate
their pursuit of public reason. Again emergent from its orientation
toward establishing a deliberative democracy, modern republicanism
stresses the need to allow reason instead of mere interests to capture
political processes. Republicanism takes aim at pluralism-"the deep
mistrust of people's capacities to communicate persuasively to one
another their diverse normative experiences: [O]f needs and rights,
values and interests, and, more broadly, interpretations of the
world."' 117 By valuing persuasion, and the habituation toward it that
education can provide,
the republican revival "reasserts the value of
' 118
reason in politics."
But approaches to reason can go one of two ways: Rationality
can be based in consensus or in conflict. The better reading of neorepublicanism must take note of its central commitment to contestation
and explicating this feature will take us to the end of our crash course
in modern theories of republicanism.
G. SUMMING UP: DEMOCRACYAND DISAGREEMENT
Whether or not Wood is right that John Adams' memory served
him badly in later years, Adams is on record as claiming that he "never
understood" what a republic was, and that "no man ever did or will."'1 19
Modern republicans have divergent ideas about what republicanism
means, although I have tried to provide a typology of some of the
dominant components of the commitment. Clearly, my typology is not
exhaustive. A fuller account would treat republicanism's relationship
to soldiering, emphasizing how the suffrage was extended to blacks
and women as they were given military responsibilities. 120 It might
link republicanism to theories of workplace democracy. 12 1 It might
116. James Madison, The FederalistNo. XLIX, supra n. 19, at vol. 11,344, 348.
117. Michelman, supra n. 2, at 1507.
118. Sellers, supra n. 7, at 117.
119. Wood, supra n. 28, at 48.
120. See Amar, supra n. 40, at 771-72 (citing Pocock, supra n. 28, at 88-90, 390,
401-22).
121. See e.g. Robert Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy 68-70 (U. Cal. Press
1985); Edward S. Greenberg, Workplace Democracy: The Political Effects of
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explore just how important it was for women to live under a republic,
rather than another form of government. 122 It would very likely need
to trace republicanism's relationship to religion. 123 Even in Sunstein's
rather secular exposition, he notes that republicanism should help
"[i]nterpretations of the [E]stablishment [C]Iause... recognize the role
of religious organizations in the cultivation of republican virtues;
approaches to the clause that end up disfavoring religion undervalue
124
the role of intermediate organizations in a pluralistic society."
Surely, there are also those who think neo-republicanism should take a
much more suspicious view of religion. 12 5 However, all these
contestable themes further buttress the sort of story I have spent this
Part telling-that the important version of republicanism to retain is its
contestatory spirit of redescription and renewal, its gesture towards
history without feeling constrained by the historical, and its
commitment to reason-giving.
Pettit casts republicanism in this light: "It supports an exciting
way of rethinking democratic institutions, in which the notion of
consent is displaced by that of contestability." 126 Republicanism is
combative: It seems to prefer agonistic contestation to consensus.
Although White tries to argue that "[r]epublicanism, as a
historiographic perspective, rejects both 'conflict' and 'consensus' as
explanatory motifs, 1 27 he clearly recognizes republican scholarship as
an alternative to both Hartzian liberalism by "de-emphasizing the
uniqueness and continuity of American ideas and institutions" and
Beardian progressivism, by "restoring ideas to a position of
independent causal significance." ' 12 8 Hartz was worried exactly about
Participation 169-71 (Cornell U. Press 1986); Christopher Eaton Gunn, Workers' SelfManagement in the United States 193 (Cornell U. Press 1984).
122. See Kerber, supra n. 37, at 482-83 (citing Montesquieu, supra n. 70; CharlesLouis de Secondat Montesquieu, The Persian Letters (John Ozell, trans., Garland
Publg. 1972), and arguing that "it made a substantial difference to women whether or
not they lived under a republican form of government").
123. See Pangle, supra n. 28, at 198.

124. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1578; see Brown, supra n. 100, at 99 (noting religion's
centrality to republican government alongside education).
125. In general, we can expect the Reason-Worshippers to want to displace religion
to the fullest extent possible without coming off as illiberal. In this regard, note the
"liberal" reaction to Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
126. Pettit, supra n. 10, at 12.
127. White, supra n. 3, at 5.
128. Id. at 9.
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the problems associated with aiming for political consensus: "I believe
that this is the basic ethical problem of a liberal society: [N]ot the
danger of the majority, which has been its conscious fear, but the
danger of unanimity, which has slumbered unconsciously 29
behind it:
[T]he 'tyranny of opinion' that Tocqueville saw unfolding."1
By appreciating with the Federalistthat the only solid basis for
all our rights is "public opinion, and the general spirit of the people and
the government,"' 130 republicanism embraces the changeability of that
opinion and spirit. Although virtue and intelligence are always central,
what counts as constitutive of such features for the republicans is
largely a matter of argument. Michelman is on to this from the
beginning:
Neo-republicanism involves the ongoing revision of the normative
histories that make political communities sources of contestable
value and self-direction for their members. This tinkering entails
not only the recognition but also the kind of re-cognitionreconception-of those histories that will always be needed to
extend political community to persons in our midst who have as
yet no stakes in "our" past because they had no access to it. 131
While perhaps overstating the degree of contestation that a theory of
republicanism can accommodate, Michelman surely sets the stage for a
version of republicanism that is always being rewritten.
Sellers wrongly focuses on neo-republicanism's commitment to
Reason to find it a theory of consensus, aiming to swallow all
perspectives into its vision of the common good.132 He ignores what
Sunstein tries to emphasize: "Modem republicanism is thus not
grounded in a belief in homogeneity; on the contrary, heterogeneity is
necessary if republican systems are to work." 133 Nonetheless, this rift
between the antagonistic republicans who prize contestation, and the
rationalist republicans who prize consensus, is still detectable in
modem discussions of republicanism, as many deliberative democrats

129. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretationof American

Political Thought Since the Revolution 11 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1955).
130. Alexander Hamilton, The FederalistNo. LXYX1V, supra n. 19, at vol. II, 152,
157.

131. Michelman, supra n. 2, at 1495.
132. See Sellers, supra n. 7, at 118; Sellers, supra n. 60, at 157.
133. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1576.
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have absorbed Habermasian jargon,134 and with it too much confidence
in Reason's potential to be fully convincing. 135 Just as Hartz and
Tocqueville recoiled at the tyranny of opinion, 136 so should republicans
recoil at the tyranny of Reason and refuse to allow public reason to be
dominated by one version of truth or good procedure. Sunstein, who
oscillates back and forth defending at once consensus and contestation,
basically gets it right: "The republican belief in agreement as a
regulative ideal, and the republican conception of political truth, are
pragmatic in character. They do not depend on a belief in ultimate
foundations for political outcomes."' 13 7 The appeal to pragmatism
illuminates the contestatory drive of republicanism because
pragmatism does not settle on a fixed notion of truth;138 neither should
republicans if they want republicanism to remain vital, relevant, and a
source of legitimate political action. When Sellers calls republicanism
"cultural self-expression through law,"' 139 he is right only because

134. See e.g. Jtirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 4-5 (William Rehg ed.,
MIT Press 1996) (singing the praises of "communicative reason" and its capacity to
ground rights, and the rule of law).
135. For thinkers who may be guilty of this proclivity to treat Reason as dispositive,
see Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 4-7 (Yale U. Press 1980);
Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy:
Essays on Reason and Politics 67, 85 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., MIT Press
1997); David Gauthier, Public Reason, 12 Soc. Phil. & Policy 19 (1995) It is
important to remember that deliberative democracy has a life of its own and my
comments about republicanism here shouldn't be read to be a serious treatment of the
deliberative democracy literature, even if Jack Balkin is right that deliberative
democracy is the "successor in interest" to the republican revival. See e-mail from
Jack Balkin, Knight Prof. of Const. L. & First Amend., to Ethan J. Leib (Jan. 30, 2002)
(copy on file with Whittier Law Review). For the author's approach to that literature,
see Leib, supra note 35, at 408-27.
136. Hartz, supra n. 129, at 11; Tocqueville, supra n. 33, at 250-61.
137. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1554.
138. ld. 1554-55; see Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in
20th Century America (Harv. U. Press 1998) (Presenting a representative view of the
agonistic-deliberative-democratic-pragmatist strain of republicanism I have been
arguing for); Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress: PhilosophicalPapersvol. 3, 19-42
(Cambridge U. Press 1998); Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 44-45
(Cambridge U. Press 1989). Interestingly, pragmatism is having its own more recent
revival, and this may reinvigorate the republican revival, allowing it to careen in new
directions. See The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and
Culture (Morris Dickstein ed., Duke U. Press 1998).
139. Sellers, supra n. 7, at 99 (citing M.J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in
American Constitutional Thought, 29 William & Mary L. Rev. 57, 73 (1973)).
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republicanism recognizes that both culture and our modes of
expressing it must change over time precisely through contesting the
meanings of that culture, that expression, and those laws. The central
concern of the next Part is the consideration of just who should be
doing the contesting.
III. THE HERCULEAN WEAKNESS OF FOCUSING ON COURTS

I should make clear that this is not the place to talk exhaustively
about why focusing on courts to concretize republican norms is a bad
idea. 140 The primary purpose of this Part is instead to show that the
republican revivalists do indeed focus upon the judiciary and that there
is room for republicanism to aim for an alternative focus-one that can
be useful at a time when arguments for judicial activism seem like the
last thing progressives really need or want.
A. THE COURT FETISH-AND ITS INDIGNITY
Designing a mode of judicial review sympathetic to the
revivalists' project became neo-republicans' primary agenda, probably
because many lawyers are trained to convince judges, and because they
were coping with a Reagan presidency and a Republican Congress.
Moreover, since the theory counterpoises itself to interest-group
pluralism, and since legislatures seem most guilty of this sin, the
judiciary seems like it is well situated to function as a savior. By
noting that "[i]n any representative democracy, there is simply too
much slippage between legislative outcomes and constituent desires,"
Sunstein focuses republican energy on a different branch of
government to effect the changes he thinks republicanism warrants,
even though part of republicanism's thrust is fundamentally
populist. 14 1 "Not only are Sunstein's judicial proposals among his
most fully developed, but even some of his non-judicial suggestions are
implemented by judicial means." 142 Michelman is no less monolithic
140. See Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? 1-8 (U. Chi. Press 1991) (arguing that the strategy is ineffectual); Jeremy
Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public Policy xi-xii, 112-14
(Basic Books 1989) (arguing that such an approach is harmful to the realization of the
norms); Bickel, Least Dangerous,supra n. 24, at 16-23 (elaborating upon the "countermajoritarian difficulty").
141. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1546-48.
142. Abrams, supra n. 1, at 1602.
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in his focus: Presiding over his version of republicanism are the courts.
"Michelman describes [the judicial branch] as 'assisting in the
maintenance' of the popular dialogue; but in fact their role is more
substantial." 1 43 To be sure, Sunstein now realizes that it may be better
to stoke contestatory deliberation in the legislature, but he
still uses the
44
courts to get his deliberative democracy off the ground. 1
Paul Brest is also sensitive to this fixation: "Most radically-at
least for legal scholars-we must abandon our obsession with courts
and work toward the decentralization and democratization, not only of
'ordinary' politics, but of constitutional discourse and decision making
itself."' 145 He makes this claim because he recognizes, with Powell,
that many arguments for deliberative politics "[sound] ...very much

like an argument for government by an independent judiciary, which is
scarcely a program for broad political participation."
But Brest goes
further towards helping us to be suspicious of such an independent
judiciary recruited for its embodiment of the right sort of deliberation
and contestation:

"Much of the republican scholarship ...

seems to

14 7
assume a naive view ofjudicial deliberations."
Because of the republican faith in judicial review, republicans
expend a fair amount of energy on imagining specific judicial
recommendations to bring about their ideal regime. Of their most
interesting recommendations is a rethinking of rationality review, or
minimal scrutiny. 14 8 Its classic formulation, the investigation of
whether legislation bears a rational relation to a legitimate state

143. Id. at 1594 (citing Michelman, supra n. 2, at 1500).
144. Sunstein, supra n. 13, at 101 n. 8.
145. Brest, supra n. 8, at 1623.
146. Powell, supra n. 29, at 1708. (Remember that we rarely get a clean statement
about whether participation is a means to or an end of republican government).
147. Brest, supra n. 8, at 1625 n. 14 (suggesting that a more skeptical view may be
found in: Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court
(Simon & Schuster 1979); Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1298 (1960); Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 765
(1982)); see generally Edward P. Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness
Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court (Times Books 1998) (where
the author, a former clerk for the United State Supreme Court, suggests that the
environment at the Court is decidedly non-deliberative).
148. See Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1576, 1579; Sunstein, supra n. 21, at 1695-1704;
Cass Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982
Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 141-45; Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
Stan. L. Rev. 29, 85-86 (1985).
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purpose, is utilized by republicans as amenable to a definition of
rationality that requires deliberation by legislators. 149 But instead of
thinking directly about how legislators can be encouraged to ignore
"naked preferences," republicans fixate on judicial policing. Though
the approach ultimately emerges from a slightly different
orientation, 150 the republicans basically have in mind a rationality
review "with bite," as they notice the Court occasionally doing a more
exacting scrutiny of legislative action, even under the guise of a
deferential rational-basis test.151 To be sure, such heightened rationalbasis tests are generally triggered because of quasi-suspect
classifications, so they probably have little in common with the sort of
approach republicans endorse in their emphasis on procedural integrity.
But republicans nevertheless see access to judicial decision-making,
focusing their energy on trying to accomplish a form of judicial
oversight of the political process.
Critics rightly emphasize that "[c]ivic republicans must ... work
to re-create a space for citizens and non-judicial institutions to
participate in constitutional discourse and [decision making.]" 152 But
this recognition (or re-cognition?) never crystallizes into attention to
the legislative process, mostly because in juxtaposing their orientation
to interest-group pluralism, they are forced to be suspicious of
representatives who, by and large, inevitably seem to act in accordance
with the pluralist model. Brest writes that the space for citizens must
be re-created "because there have been times during our history when
constitutional discourse was not the near-exclusive domain of
courts." 153 But what the critics accomplish is largely a shift in
attention to populism and civil society.
149. E.g. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. N.Y, 336 U.S. 106, 115-17 (1949).
150. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-24 (1972).
151. See U.S. Dept. Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973) (applying

rational-basis "with bite," striking a policy aimed against hippies); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (applying same as to the mentally
retarded); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (applying same as to

homosexuals).
152. Brest, supra n. 8, at 1629.
153. Id. at 1629 n. 37.
He recommends

looking at "the debates over the

constitutionality of slavery before the Civil War." Id. Brest also makes overtures to
congressional input without really fleshing out its relationship to republicanism,
making his emphasis populism. Id. at 1624-25.
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Without too much elaboration, it suffices to note that neorepublicans have started to intone the value of civic virtue, and have
come to appreciate the role of popular institutions in entrenching their
catalogue of virtues. The citations to Robert Putnam in the law reviews
have mushroomed, 154 and the corrective to the judicial focus has fully
taken hold. Even Pettit's highly theoretical approach to republicanism
makes the claim that "if the republican state is to achieve its ends ... it
must connect with a form of civil society in which republican values
are firmly entrenched: [I]t cannot expect to work such wonders on its
own." 155 To be sure, this corrective is much needed and is
immediately responsive to the critiques of Brest and Abrams: "By
reassessing the role of substantive norms, and placing legislative
participants as well as judges in our sights, we can reclaim the popular
'
collectivist strain of republican thought that has thus far eluded us. 159
But few ever really think about how republicanism can directly touch
Jurisprudential theory, popular political
legislative participants.
institutional reform, and voluntary organizations seem accessible.
Apparently, legislatures seem doomed to play out the pluralist
nightmare until the end of days. Even Mark Tushnet, who urges us to
take the Constitution away from the courts, argues for a "populist"
law;
the role of the legislature remains
constitutional
57
underdeveloped. 1
Jerry Mashaw understands acutely how this oversight occurs:158
"Sunstein's argument has the... attraction of providing an alternative
to the rather depressing interpretive paradigms recently proposed by
scholars heavily influenced by the public choice literature of the past
four decades." 159 Since republicanism is addressed to this literature, it

154. E.g. LexisNexis Group, LexisNexis at Lexis.com <http://www.lexis.com>
(accessed on Oct. 17, 2002) (querying Robert Putnam produced 250 results); West
Group, Westlaw <http://www.westlaw.com> (accessed on Oct. 17, 2002) (querying
Robert Putnam produced 225 results); see e.g. Ethan J.Leib, Student Author, On the
Difficulty of Imagining an Aesthetic Politics, 12 Yale J. L. & Human. 151, 155 n. 10
(2000) (where the author contributes to this overcorrection).
155. Pettit, supra n. 10, at 13.
156. Abrams, supra n. I, at 1592-93.
157. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts 9-32 (Princeton
U. Press 1999).
158. See generally Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation,97 Yale L. J. 1685,
1688 (1988).
159. Id.
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must take a cold approach to legislation. As stated for the publicchoicers:
[T]he image of the legislature is the image of private contract.
Legislation is but a set of "deals" between interest groups and reelection-oriented politicians. As such, it aggregates without
synthesizing, it compels without expressing. Interpretation, on
this view, is only the discernment of the precise 60degree to which
state power has been aligned to private interests. 1
Primarily for these reasons, republicanism ignores legislatures. 161
B. THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION

Jeremy Waldron argues for "the dignity of legislation." 162 He
imagines statutes to be "held, implemented and enforced as ours in
spite of our individual disagreements as to what it ought to be-by
deliberation that stands credibly in the name of us all, deliberation that
confronts our differences in public and settles on a common view as a
matter of social choice." 163 Of course, Waldron realizes that we will
always experience "jurisprudential unease about legislation" because it
is the "product of an assembly-the many, the multitude, the rabble (or
their representatives)."' 164 But he thinks we do legislation a disservice
low-bred
when we allow "a statute [to] thrust ...itself before us as a 165
heritage."
no
and
power
all
depth,
no
and
surface
all
parvenu,
He argues that the degree of disrespect afforded to statutes and
legislation is largely a creation of the more general fixation in legal
theory upon the courts: "We paint legislation up in these lurid shades
in order to lend credibility to the idea of judicial review.., and to
silence what would otherwise be our embarrassment about the

160. Id. at 1688-89 (citing Allan Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, The Semiology of
Statutes, 21 Harv. J. Legis. 583 (1984); Richard Davies Parker, The Past of
ConstitutionalTheory-and Its Future,42 Ohio St. L.J. 223 (1981)).
161. For a review of how republicanism ignores legislatures, see supra note 13, and
accompanying text. It is arguable that Sunstein's view is nevertheless weighed down
by its attention to how the courts are supposed to incite legislative deliberation.
162. Waldron, supra n. 11, at 1. Waldron believes that "legislation and legislatures
have a bad name in legal and political philosophy, a name sufficiently disreputable to
cast doubt on their credentials as respectable sources of law." Id. at 1.
163. Id. at 89-90.
164. Id. at 31.
165. Id. at 10-11.
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democratic or 'counter-majoritarian' difficulties." 166 These painters
caricature statutes as unfortunate and ill-considered attempts at legal
action in service of the public good. 16 7 Waldron even draws our
attention to those that don't consider legislation to be in the genus
"law. 16 8 When Langdell published a review of Albert Venn Dicey's
Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England
During the Nineteenth Century, he noted that regardless the title, it was
'169
"inno sense a law book."
Langdell further noted, "[a]s commonly
used by lawyers, the word means law as administered by courts of
justice in suits between litigating parties, but here it is clearly not used
in that sense, but in the sense of legislation." 170 Surely, these days, the
view of legislation is not as bleak, but the republican revivalists do
seem guilty of this exclusionary attitude.
Also, the republican penchant for contestation and deliberative
disagreement is quite applicable to the particular view of legislation
that Waldron propounds. Invoking Machiavelli, one of the patron
saints of the republican tradition, 171 Waldron reminds us:
Machiavelli warned us, almost five hundred years ago, not to be
fooled into thinking that calmness and solemnity are the mark of a
good polity, and noise and conflict a symptom of political
pathology. "Good laws," he said, may arise "from those tumults
that many inconsiderately damn." 172
With a full frontal attack on the consensus strain of
republicanism, Waldron sees in legislation contestation that may effect

166. Id. at 2 (citing Bickel, Least Dangerous,supra n. 24, at 16).
167. See e.g. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 5-7 (Harv. U.
Press 1982); S. E. Baldwin, Two Centuries' Growth of American Law, 1701-1901 4-5
(U. Press 1901).
168. Waldron, supra n. 11, at 1-2.
169. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dominant Opinions in England During the
Nineteenth Century in Relation to Legislation, As Illustratedby English Legislation, or
the Absence of It, During the Period, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 151, 153 (1906) (emphasis
added) (reviewing A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public
Opinion in EnglandDuring the Nineteenth Century (McMillan & Co. 1914)).
170. Id. at 151.
171. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Fortune Is a Woman: Gender & Politics in the Thought
of Niccol6 Machiavelli 4 (U. Cal. Press 1984) (describing Machiavelli as a "committed,
lifelong republican").
172. Waldron, supra n. 11, at 34 (citing Niccol6 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy
vol. 1, 16 (Harvey Mansfield & Nathan Tarcov trans., U. Chi. Press 1996)).
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the sort of "deliberate change" Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart hopes for
in his concept of law. 173 While of course taking notice that Hart's
vision of deliberate change has been downplayed by modem theorists
such as Joseph Raz (who is often concerned with the rule 1of
74
recognition in courts and their capacity for norm-enforcement),'
Waldron emphasizes the re-cognition that can take place in legislatures.
Therefore, those who care about law emerging from deliberation-an
overt goal of the neo-republicans-should pay more attention to
legislatures, even if it sometimes seems na've to trust them to contest
authentically, whatever that may mean.
But to redescribe representatives as trustees, and not merely
agents who must simply enact a slate of electoral preferences, a rubber
bullet needs to be launched against the fetishization of majority rule.
This faith in majorities can be detected in neo-republicans who spend
too much time worrying about popular sovereignty. 15 Waldron has
the ammunition waiting, drawing upon no less impressive republicans
than Aristotle and Locke. 176 First, Waldron reminds us that there is
nothing sacrosanct about the authority of the majority, arguing that:
[B]y itself the principle implies nothing about suffrage. The
corrupt House of Commons, bought and sold by [eighteenth]century English property-owners, used majority-decision ....
For
all we know, councils of terrorists use it for selecting their targets,
77
when they disagree about who their next victims should be.'

173. See id. at 14-15 (where Waldron comments about Hart in particular); see
generally H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford U. Press 1961).
174. E.g. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law
and Politics280 n. 28 (Clarendon Press 1994).
175. E.g. Amar, supra n. 40, at 749.
176. To be sure, Locke is usually associated with the pluralist enemies of
republicanism. See Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the United States
Constitution 73-151 (MacMillan & Co. 1913) (providing analysis of this Lockean
tradition of interest-group pluralism by surveying the interests of the members of the
constitutional convention). In this regard, it is interesting to note that the classic
statement of the Lockean tradition, in which so many from the economic Right take
pride, emerged from a Marxist orientation toward writing the history of the Founding.
See Pangle, supra n. 28, at 131-279 (reading Locke to absorb and inspire much of the
republican tradition); Waldron supra n. 11, at 124-26 (helping Pangle's case by
appropriating Locke for republicanism).
177. Waldron, supra n. 11, at 125.
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This argument disarms majority rule. Waldron goes further to
defend general representative government, invoking no less an
authority (and elitist) than John Stuart Mill:
Everyone has a right to feel insulted by being made a nobody, and
stamped as of no account at all. No one but a fool ... feels
offended by the acknowledgment that there are others whose
opinion, and even whose wish, is entitled to a greater amount of
consideration than his. 178
Aristotle helps Waldron along because Waldron detects a
"Doctrine of the Wisdom of Multitude" (not the majority) in the
Politics.179 He defines the strong version as follows: "The people
acting as a body are capable of making better decisions, by pooling the
knowledge, experience, and insight, than any subset of the people
acting as a body and pooling their knowledge, experience, and insight
of the members of the subset. ' 18° Whether this doctrine is a loyal
reading of Aristotle is not really the issue; the doctrine helps us see
why legislative bodies, representative of the people at large in some
nonfictive sense, can arrive at decent decisions. Culling again from
Aristotle, Waldron propounds the idea that the wisdom of the multitude
is only in effect when the body meets together in an assembly and the
members greet each other face-to-face.
Of course, this paradigm
works mostly because Aristotle presupposes a catalogue of intellectual
virtues in the representatives who come together to legislate, a
182
question-begging assumption to be sure.
To fill the gap created by the unrealistic assumption that
legislators have any incentive to nurture their intellectual virtues when
they may instead barrel the pork, roll the logs, and seek the rents, there
are the bits of Locke to which Waldron appeals to "make a case for
John Locke as a theorist or proto-theorist of deliberative
democracy."1 83 Waldron draws our attention to the Second Treatise's
178. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 335
(Prometheus Books 1991) (quoted in Waldron, supra n. 11, at 161).
179. Id. at 94.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 115.
182. Aristotle, The Politics,Book H in The Complete Works ofAristotle vol. 2, 2000,
2033-34, 1281bl-b20 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Oxford trans., Princeton U. Press 1984);
Waldron, supra n. 11, at 115.
183. Waldron, supra n. 11, at 82.
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argument that "the legislature is supreme, that it must never be subject
to any other body, and thus to judicial review."' 184 Its supremacy
results precisely because Locke is sure that even though Natural Law
should always be a guide, even intellectuals will disagree about what
Nature requires. Waldron shows that Locke was aware that his ideas
would be "counter-intuitive,"' 185 indicating a healthy space of
disagreement that legislatures can live within. By showing Locke to be
aware of fundamental contestation to be mediated by legislation,
Waldron can recruit him in
his general effort to stress law's
86
relationship to disagreement. 1
The last move needed to link Locke with a republican theory of
dissensus is to suggest with Waldron that "Locke [thinks] that
legislators are more likely to come up with a correct answer by
reasoning aloud in each other's presence and then voting."' 187 Waldron
states:
Locke stresses how important it is for representatives to "freely act
and advise, as the necessity of the Commonwealth, and the public
good should upon examination, and mature debate be judged to
require. This, those who give their Votes before they hear the
Debate, and have' 18weighed
the Reasons on all sides, are not
8
doing."
of
capable
Whether this is a representative selection from the same Locke
who expends great energy on his theory of Natural Law, and its
objective nature, is less important for our purposes than seeing in a new
light a way to conceive of legislatures as sites of deliberative
contestation.
Locke understood that there would be radical
disagreement about what Natural Law requires. "What the legislators
are supposed to do is attempt as honestly as they can (by reasoning
together) to work out whether various proposals before them are in line
with what Natural Law requires."' 189 Since for Locke a central

184. Id. at 63-64; see John Locke, Two Treatises of Government vol. 11, 353 (Peter

Laslett ed., Cambridge U. Press 1988).
185. Waldron, supra n. 11, at 74-75 (citing Locke, supra n. 183, at 272-73, 292-93,
296, 317-18, 342-43, 388).
186. See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 23-24 (Oxford U. Press
2001).

187. Waldron, supra n. 11, at 81.
188. Id. at 82 (citing Locke, supra n. 184, at 222).
189. Waldron, supra n. 11, at 86.
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characteristic of legislatures is their capacity to get things plain wrong,
the process of legislation has an open-ended quality, amenable to a
variety of fallible enactments, as long as those enactments do not
conspire to close off "civil conversation."
As usual, the cynic will not care about the possible. She will tell
us to glance at our politicians and our legislatures before we look to
rely on a capacities argument. We are sure to find, as a general matter,
that to which she is drawing our attention. 19 Nevertheless, there are
moments when legislatures act as Locke imagined, as Waldron hopes
for, and the project here is to get republicans to internalize this vision.
If the arguments to come are sound, republicans will be able to
effect their legislation using the Guarantee Clause as a jurisdictional
basis, a clause the courts have generally refused to interpret themselves
without the help of the political branches. By focusing their arguments
on legislative possibilities, republicans might see access to what they
once perceived as untouchable because it was pluralist through and
through. In this re-conception, republicanism could find a new power
for the theory, the power of the Guarantee Clause. The next Part will
provide a whirlwind tour of the sort of legislation republicans might try
to encourage legislatures to pass if they were found actually to have the
power to guarantee, with all legislation necessary and proper, a
republican form of government.
To be sure, I choose some
counterintuitive legislative moves to sanction by way of the Guarantee
Clause. Some more obvious attempts could be made too, but I figure if
I stretch it, it will snap back to cover the easy cases.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR NEO-REPUBLICANISM
In the last seven years, we have witnessed the Court castrate
congressional powers under various theories of overreaching. In a line
of cases that probably can be said to start with U.S. v. Lopez, 19 1 and
City of Boerne v. Flores,192 the Court has substantially undermined
what Congress may do under its Commerce Power of Article I, Section
Eight and its Section Five Enforcement Power in the Fourteenth
Amendment, respectively. 19 3 Although this is hardly the place to

190.
191.
192.
193.

Contra Bessette, supra n. 12, at 1-5.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551; Boerne,521 U.S. at 51I.

HeinOnline -- 24 Whittier L. Rev. 178 2002-2003

2002]

REDEEMING THE WELSHED GUARANTEE

provide a review of-or even a bibliography for-the interpretation of
these cases, it suffices to note that, pragmatically speaking, Congress
may need to look elsewhere if it wishes to continue to pass what it
perceives to be important legislation. My contention here is that
theories of republicanism may help. If Congress can make legislative
findings about what republican government requires, it may have
access to an as yet undeveloped power, which may effectively support
the passage of the kinds of legislation that the Court has been striking
in a recent line of cases. Since the Guarantee Clause only vests
Congress with the ability to guarantee a republican form of
government, I will need to take up the difficult question of what shall
count as "form," and what as "substance" (although it is hardly clear
that the Clause means to draw this modern distinction). Nevertheless,
here I gloss over this issue very briefly, so that I may give the reader
more context for the potential ambit of the Clause before parsing its
syntax. In any case, even if the particular legislative acts endorsed
under the Clause here seem too facile and make the Clause too elastic,
such a conclusion hardly undermines the main purpose of this exercise:
To show that the Guarantee Clause can be used as a jurisdictional basis
for Congress to pass laws necessary and proper to guarantee a
republican form of government, even if they have to spend some time
arguing about what counts as republican and what counts as good form.
A. THE PESTORATION OFRELIGIOUS FREEDOMUNDER
NEO-REPUBLICANISM
19 4
When the Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,
severely curtailing Free Exercise rights as enunciated in cases such as
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 19 5 and Sherbert v. Verner,196 Congress did not
take the decision sitting down. They reacted with a bipartisan measure,
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 1 97
RFRA was passed under the pretense of the legislative authority
conferred by the Section Five Enforcement Power of the Fourteenth
Amendment, giving Congress a penumbra of power to enforce the Free

194. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
195. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
196. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
197. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (2000); John T. Noonan, Jr. & Edward McGlynn Gaffney,
Religious Freedom: History, Cases, and Other Materials on the Interaction of
Religion and Government 496 (2d ed., Found. Press 2001).
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Exercise Clause through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 8 It aimed itself directly to undermine the Court's
pronouncements in Smith: RFRA was explicitly Congress's attempt to
impose its assessment of the constitutionality of Smith upon the Court,
trying to force it to
go back to the Yoder and Sherbert protections of
19 9
religious freedom.
In Boerne, the Court told Congress just what it thought about
their attempt to control the Court's balancing tests. 2 °° The Court
would not allow congressional overreaching by using its Enforcement
Powers in ways that are not decidedly remedial: "There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.''2 1 The Court tried to
reaffirm Congress's broad power under Section Five, while
simultaneously trying to delimit use of that power in "substantive"
legislative acts. 2° 2 In so doing the Court created the "congruence and
proportionality test" that has been the thorn in the side of many
attempts at progressive legislation.
Finding RFRA to fail this
newfound test, the Court struck down Congress's bipartisan effort to
give a "democratic" interpretation
to what the free exercise of religion
2 °3
means to the polity.
Without too much analysis, we can question the Court's activism
against a "democratically" determined interpretation of a constitutional
provision. Nonetheless, for the neo-republicans fixated on judicial
review, they may have a hard time dismissing the Court's insistence
upon protecting constitutional interpretation from what they might see
as a tyranny of the majority. After all, one theory of judicial reviewone often invoked by neo-republicans-is precisely that majorities
cannot always be trusted to protect individual rights enshrined in the

198. Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Constitutional
Law: Themes for the Constitution's Third Century 218 (2d ed., West 1998).
199. Noonan & Gaffney, supra n. 197, at 496.
200. City of Boerne v. Flores,521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
201. Id. at 520.
202. Robert C. Post & Reva Siegel, Equal Protection by Law:
Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L. J. 441, 457
(2001). They argue that "neither Boerne nor Kimel ever clearly explains the distinction
between remedial and substantive legislation."
Id. (citing Douglas Laycock,
Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 743, 767-70
(1998)).
203. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
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Constitution, and it is the Court's province to be the institutional
guarantor of those individual rights.2 04 But what if republicans
embraced a different vision of republicanism? What if constitutional
discourse was open to congressional readings? 20 5 More specifically,
what if the Guarantee Clause gives Congress the power to legislate in
pursuance of its understanding about what a republican form of
government entails? Religion is an easy case for republicans. As Part
II suggested, religion and its protection is clearly tied to republican
theory, both historically and in its modem incarnation. Any legislative
findings and contests about the relationship of religion to republican
forms of government could start with Pangle's documentary proof of
the historical fact of their inextricability, 206 and then move to
Sunstein's idea that religion probably needs to be protected obsessively
in any republic for the "cultivation of republican virtues. ' 2° 7 Without
such substance, no formal requirements for republican government can
be met; religion's protection is a formal prerequisite for any republican
government. In any event, these sorts of tailored findings would likely
support some kind of RFRA-like legislation were Congress to have the
power to guarantee to each of the states, by appropriate legislation,
with all means
necessary and proper, a republican form of
20 8
government.

B. THE RESTORATION OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
UNDER NEO-REPUBLICANiSM

The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) afforded a civil
remedy for people adjudged to be victims of gender-motivated

204. See e.g. Pettit, supra n. 10, at 180-83.
205. See e.g. City ofRome v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156, 207 (1980) (acknowledging that the
Reconstruction Amendments might allow Congress's various Enforcement Powers to
pronounce constitution violations that a Court would not find under the same
amendment); Or. v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966); S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). For my purposes, however, Iam
highlighting areas where the Court has been particularly resistant to extend to Congress
a voice in constitutional interpretation.
206. See Brown, supra n. 100, at 99; Pangle, supra n. 28, at 198-229.
207. Sunstein, supra n. 2, at 1578.
208. This time around, however, I think Congress should not be so fixated on telling
the Court how to conduct its own balancing tests. By playing nice, Congress is more
likely to be heeded by what is, in effect, another political branch.
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violence. 209 Two congressional powers were recruited to justify its
enactment-the Commerce Power and the Section Five Enforcement
Power.2 1 In United States v. Morrison,2 1 1 the Court determined that
neither of these powers vested Congress with the appropriate authority
By applying Boerne's "congruence and
to pass VA WA. 2 12
proportionality test," the Court disposed of the Enforcement Power's
scope, and by applying the principles of Lopez, the Court rejected that
the legislative findings sanction such a broad measure as was exercised
in VA WA under the Commerce Clause. 2 13 Whittling away at two of
Congress's enumerated broad grants of power under the Constitution,
the Court left Congress impotent to rectify its own determination that
gender-motivated violence requires some congressional federal
policing.
As with many of the Court's recent decisions, concerns about
federalism and states' rights intrude upon the Court's readiness to give
the Congress broad powers to organize state activities. I do not intend
here to evaluate how federalism should be balanced with Congress's
constitutional exercises of powers, or how federalism might be used as
a technique of statutory interpretation. However, we don't need to
embrace the theory of the orphaned Garcia v. San Antonio
that federalism should simply be
Metropolitan Transit Authority,
left to the political process, to make the claim that Congress's
enumerated powers should be given more deference than the current
Court seems willing to provide. 2 15 Nevertheless, as a matter of
practicality the holding of Morrison is likely to continue to restrict
Congress's ability to pass the sort of protections VA WA was meant to
provide if Congress can only recruit the two powers at issue therein.
Leaving to one side the Court's reliance on ancient and
indeterminate precedents for the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment, "[has] reference to State action exclusively, ' 2 16 the Court

209. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
210. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 604 (2000).
211. Id. at 598.
212. Id. at 627.
213. Id. at 607-11.
214. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
215. Id. at 546-47, 552-54.
216. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 671 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883);
U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883)).
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nonetheless seems committed to a robust state action requirement.
This is not the place to contest the need for that requirement, or make
recommendations for the Court to look to the Citizenship Clause of the
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, or to look to the
Enforcement Clauses of the other Reconstruction Amendments-as
2 17
(the first Justice) Harlan did in his dissent to The Civil Rights Cases.
Instead, the legislative focus to the theory of republicanism propounded
in Part II recommends for the legislature to make an attempt to pass
VA WA-like legislation under their enumerated power to guarantee a
republican form of government to the states. Brewer v. Hoxie School
Districtseems to suggest quite overtly that the Guarantee Clause is not
limited by a state action requirement. 218
Perhaps the more intuitive clause to look to might be found in
different provision of Article V, Section Four (where the Guarantee
Clause is located)-the Domestic Violence Clause. We might imagine
some reading of that clause in another possible world-for example the
DVC-in-alpha-that would sanction congressional power to get
involved in the problem of gender-motivated violence and pass any
2 19
legislation necessary and proper to address the problem.
Nevertheless, the focus here is on the Guarantee Clause, emphasizing
how Congress might pass progressive legislation under their power to
say what a republican form of government requires.
Unfortunately, policing gender-motivated violence does not-at
first blush-appear to raise any issue of republicanism and seems even
further removed from republican forms. In fact, theories of classical
republicanism and the theories of republicanism prevalent at the
founding are notorious for their phobic orientation against the
feminine. 22 As I noted above, patriarchy was linked closely with
republicanism, 2 2 1 and one need look no further than Minor v.

217. 109 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
218. 238 F.2d 91, 98-99 (8th Cir. 1956).
219. Tali Farhadian (Yale Law School, Class of 2003), in a discussion with me about
Article IV, made this recommendation. Unfortunately, the idea seems foreclosed by
any faithful reading of constitutional history. See generally Bybee, supra n. 5; Student
Author, Federal Intervention in the States for the Supression of Domestic Violence:
Constitutionality, Statutory Powers, and Policy, 1966 Duke L.J. 415, 458-62 (for a
longer discussion of the possibilities and the foreclosures of the Domestic Violence

Clause).
220. Kerber, supra n. 31, at 1666.
221. Id. at 1667.
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Happersett,222 to see the Supreme Court concurring with the view that
denying women the suffrage was completely consistent with a
republican form of government. 223 During the Founding, the Minor
Court argues, states that denied women rights were admitted as
republican. Therefore, women would never be heard to complain that
voter qualifications in their states deny them a republican form of
government.
Minor is a hard precedent to overcome, except for the fact that the
Court became less and less willing to commit itself to the original
intent or meaning of a republican form of government at the Founding
(which is not the case with the Domestic Violence Clause, by the
way). 2 24 The Court, as we shall see, became more and more willing to
deny justiciability and let the other political branches duke it out,
contesting over what republicanism means in the contemporary
context. Thankfully, originalism will not be an impediment to my
Guarantee Clause analysis.
And it seems clear that modem theories of republicanism are not
intrinsically as resistant to the rights of women as they once were.
Kerber has led the way, as in so much else, toward a more feminist
emphasis to republicanism. She points out that "[i]n republics,
Montesquieu suggested, women might have at ,225
least a modest degree of
ability to forge their own political identities."
She also draws our
attention to Lester Cohen's exposition of Mercy Otis Warren's analysis
of "the role of the mother with republican principles," 2 26 highlighting
how republicanism can touch the concerns of women, even if Warren's
particular concern was hardly
what progressives would imagine today
22 7
to be appropriately feminist.
Hanna Pitkin also traced republicanism's roots in malechauvinism, but Kerber hints to a note of hope by linking the extension
of who republicanism can be read to protect to the extension of who is
accepted in the military: Owing to republicanism's military fixation, it
222. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).

223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 175-76.
Farber, Eskridge & Frickey, supra n. 198, at 1050-51.
Kerber, supra n. 37, at 483; Montesquieu, supra n. 70, at 111.
Id. (citing Lester Cohen, Explaining the Revolution: Ideology and Ethics in

Mercy Otis Warren's Historical Theory, 37 Wm. & Mary Q. 200 (1980); Lester Cohen,
Mercy Otis Warren: The Politics of Language and the Aesthetics of Self, 35 Am. Q.

481 (1983)).
227. Compare id. with MacKinnon, Feminism, supra n. 89, at 5-17.

HeinOnline -- 24 Whittier L. Rev. 184 2002-2003

2002]

REDEEMING THE WELSHED GUARANTEE

2 28
became connected with the protection of those who bear arms.
Since women now serve in the army, they may now be included in the
category of people who can acquire virti or republican virtue, and are
no longer relegated to the feminine appellation offortuna, changeable
and unpredictable. 229 Because republicanism can now more easily
accommodate a feminist perspective for a variety of reasons, it might
be fruitful for Congress to employ its power to guarantee a republican
form of government in service of feminist aims.
Of course, there is countervailing evidence suggesting feminism's
incompatibility with republicanism, some of which Kerber herself
provides. 23
Therefore, another avenue for organizing a policy
program under a power to guarantee a republican form of government
might be found in the theory of non-domination explored in connection
with Pettit's theory in Part II. Utilizing his ideas about what
republicanism requires, augmented perhaps by some ideas from
MacKinnon about just what non-domination demands, Congress might
produce a very similar statutory provision to VA WA. By taking note
that domination can occur by any facilitation of arbitrary interference
with the choices of free persons, Congress may establish a civil remedy
to deter such interference. It may, of course, find that such a provision
is unnecessary. But the idea is to facilitate its capacity to start the
"civil conversation," a conversation that has been foreclosed by
Boerne's roadblock. Form is no bar either-guaranteeing a form of
government means working on culture to ensure that full participation
is available to all. Finally, as I hope to show, there is no state action
requirement constraining the Guarantee Clause. 231
If my sketch of republicanism's virtues in Part II emphasized
anything, it should have been its flexibility and its discontent with one
theory of the truth of the matter when it comes to republicanism's selfdefinition. If Congress is willing to enter a contestatory dialogue about
how VA WA might be justified under a theory of republicanism (and
republican formal prerequisites to full participation), it might be led to

228. For more on the connection between republicanism and militarism, see supra
notes 119-121, and accompanying text.
229. Kerber, supra n. 31, at 1667 (citing Pitkin, supra n. 171, at 152; Pocock, supra
n. 28, at 37).
230. Linda K. Kerber, The Republican Mother: Women and the Enlightenment-An
American Perspective, 28 Am. Q. 187, 199-205 (1976); Linda K. Kerber, Women of the
Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America 7-12 (U.N.C. Press 1980).
231. Contra Bonfield, Desuetude, supra n. 5, at 566-67.
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re-pass VA WA under completely different pretenses, but still under a
power specifically enumerated to it by the Constitution. When it
debates about what counts as republican forms, whether gender is a
source of domination should certainly be relevant; providing a civil
remedy be a proper means to reshape states' forms of government more
consistently with modern republican principles to maximize political
participation.
C. THE RESTORATION OF FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINA TION LAWS
(AND ABROGATION OFELEVENTH AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY?) UNDER NEO-REPUBLICANISM

By now, you are undoubtedly catching my drift, so let me save
some trees and make the shorter version of the argument to restore
abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
232 under
the Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 23 3 While the substance of
these provisions does not at first blush seem to be about forms of
government, surely the states' relation to the federal government-and
its sovereign immunity-could qualify as a formal matter.
In Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents, 234 the Court reaffirmed its
commitment made in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,23 5 and
subsequent cases, 236 that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the
Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by
private parties against unconsenting States. ' 2 37 Nonetheless, the Court
in Kimel acknowledges that the Enforcement Power associated with
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment "does grant Congress the
authority to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. ' 238 The Court
confirmed that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of [Section Five] of the Fourteenth
232. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000).
233. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
234. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
235. 517U.S. 44(1996).
236. E.g. Fla. PrepaidPostsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.v. College Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999); Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
237. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
238. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80.
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Amendment." 2 39 Notwithstanding this concession, the Court applied
the Boerne test to strike the provision of the ADEA that abrogates
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 24 In the ADA corollary 24to1
Kimel, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
the Court determined just the same, that Congress's Section Five
Enforcement Clause 24
Power
could not abrogate states' Eleventh
2
Amendment immunity.
Again, this is not the place to review the soundness of the Court's
application of the Boerne test.24 3
It suffices to note that
notwithstanding the Court's willingness to talk big about the
"affirmative" powers vested by the Enforcement Clause,74 4 the Court
believes that the "ultimate interpretation and determination of the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of
the Judicial Branch. ' 245 Thus, were Congress committed to the
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of the
ADEA and the ADA, it may need to look to other provisions of the
Constitution that are not generally considered to be the "province" of
the judiciary.
Moreover, Seminole Tribe determined that the
246
Commerce Clause powers are powerless to effect the abrogation.
This article recommends capitalizing upon the Guarantee Clause,

239. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
240. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83.
241. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
242. Id. at 372-74.
243. For a critical treatment of the Court's Boerne jurisprudence, see Post & Seigel,
supra n. 202, at 452-56.
244. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80-81; see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 386-87 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer stated in his dissent:
The Court's more recent cases have professed to follow the longstanding
principle of deference to Congress... "Congress' § 5 power is not confined
to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Rather, Congress can prohibit a "somewhat
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the
Amendment's text"; Congress must have wide latitude... (Congress'
"conclusions are entitled to much deference"). And even today, the Court
purports to apply, not to depart from, these standards.... But the Court's
analysis and ultimate conclusion deprive its declarations of practical
significance. The Court "sounds the word of promise to the ear but breaks it
to the hope."
Id. at 386-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
245. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
246. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996).
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giving Congress some oversight in determining how states conform to
the standards of a republican form of government. It will certainly help
matters that, as we shall see, the Court generally believes it to be the
province of the political branches to determine just what the guarantee
means.
But one large stumbling block to getting antidiscrimination law
passed under the ambit of republicanism is that republicanism doesn't
seem to speak directly to the situations of the disabled or the aged.
More, republicanism might demand specifically that states retain
sovereign immunity as a general rule-the guarantee of a republican
form of government in the Constitution might mean that Congress must
generally have a hands-off approach to states, giving them some
freedom from federal control. Under this reading of republicanism,
divided sovereignty takes a prominent place in the catalogue of
republican virtues. Thus, the theory of federalism now espoused by the
Court-surely the dominant theory that helps explain the line of cases
treated here and that buttresses support for the emasculation of
congressional authority-might need to become part of a theory of
republicanism focused upon the legislature. 2 47 Republicanism might
require state autonomy, leaving Congress unable, under republican
theory (specifically the Guarantee Clause, which may in any case be
limited by the Eleventh Amendment), to abrogate sovereign
immunity. 48
247. Merritt, supra n. 5, at 70-78 (discussing the contours of the version of
republicanism currently espoused by the Court); Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican
Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 815, 827-32 (1994) (discussing the future of the Guarantee Clause in
light of the Clause's embodiment of a "judicially enforceable limit on national
interference with state autonomy"). As with most legal scholars, Merritt focuses on
judicial review, but the theory could be extended to speak to legislatures.
248. Since the Eleventh Amendment was ratified after Article IV, the amendment
may render Guarantee Clause power as weak as the Article I powers are-after
Seminole Tribe-with respect to the abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Ultimately, I have no doubt that five judges would affirm this rationale to prevent the
abrogation. But Congress could still try to make the argument in good faith, since
Seminole Tribe was clearly limited to Article 1. 517 U.S. at 44. Even those Article I
arguments were more sophisticated than the "last in time" argument. See Kimel v. Fla,
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). That argument might be much stronger, of course,
if the Eleventh Amendment actually was written with the intent the Court has found in
it. We all know that reading to be a canard.
One more effort to save Article IV from death by Eleventh Amendment doctrine
would be to read the Reconstruction Amendments as both Professors Amar and
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Of course, republicanism might not require this at all. The point
of republicanism's flexibility is that such a value is ultimately a
question to be settled by deliberative assemblies in the legislature. If
Congress takes its responsibility seriously to guarantee a republican
form of government to the states, it may have a substantial degree of
discretion to be primarily concerned with the people of the states, not
the states themselves. In Texas v. White, 24 9 the Court decided that the
Guarantee Clause was drawn to protect the people, not the political unit
of the state or the geographic area of the state. 25 0 This focus upon the
Clause was reaffirmed in White v. Hart.2 5 1 In both of these instances,
the power of the Guarantee Clause given to Congress includes all
means "necessary and proper. ' 25 2 Hence, it would ultimately be
Congress's "province" to decide just what level of federal
antidiscrimination law is warranted to ensure a republican form of
Moreover, if constitutional interpretation of the
government.
Guarantee Clause were wholly within the province of the political
branches, Congress could reasonably decide that Eleventh Amendment
immunity does not protect states against the newly justified ADEA and
ADA suits. Surely, discrimination fails to satisfy Part II's theory of
republicanism as prizing non-domination. Encouraging Congress to
keep arguing about what means are necessary to bring about nondomination, however, does conform to Part II's theory regarding the
vision of contestatory disagreement as a primary republican virtue.
Part of the healthy disagreement in any republican government
will include judges who occasionally get their opportunity to contest
congressional enactments-and nothing said here should be read to
deny the right of judicial review. Instead, this project is aimed to show
how theories of republicanism can return to legislators a right they
once had before the Boerne test tied their hands behind their back-to
say what they think the Constitution means.

Ackerman do, as a constitutional revolution or moment that recasts the entirety of the
document that came before. Under this reading, the federal-state balance has been
recalibrated and Article IV may be saved from the tentacle of the Eleventh
Amendment.
249. 74 U.S. 700 (1868).
250. Id. at 721; Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 235-36.
251. 80 U.S. 646, 650 (1871).
252. E.g. Texas, 74 U.S. at 729; White, 80 U.S. at 650-51; Wiecek, supra n. 6, at
235-36.
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To be sure, I could go on and address what this article's
discussion of intellectual virtues might sanction by way of federal
educational policy, but the flavor of the argument should by now be
clear. What isn't clear is how this approach squares with what has
been said about the Guarantee Clause by judges and scholars. Parts V
and VI aim at this clarification.
V. STRUGGLING TOWARDS JUSTICIABILITY

In lawyers' discussions of the Guarantee Clause, we can trace a
further embodiment of the obsession with judicial review to the
detriment of republicanism. Martin Redish notes:
Because the problems to be corrected [in neo-republicanism] are
in the legislature itself, it is not surprising that, for the most part,
neo-republican scholars urge a substantial increased role for the
judiciary, which was purposely insulated from the majoritarian
2 53
political pressures.

But the contention here is that it is also not surprising that
arguments about what the Guarantee Clause means unnecessarily focus
on judicial review as well. This Part makes an effort-without making
any pretensions to an exhaustive analysis-to highlight the Supreme
Court's treatment of the Clause and scholars' reactions, both of which
concentrate on justiciability, on the question of whether the Court has
institutional competence to make determinations of what the guarantee
is supposed to mean in the functioning of the republic. This Part lays
the foundation for the thesis that the focus on judicial review obscures
the potential uses for the Clause revealed in Part IV, and argued for in
Part VI.
A.

SOME CASES

The posture of most of the challenges brought before the Court
provides a great deal of help in understanding why the cases come out
as they do. When citizens-corporateor otherwise-make attempts to
bring challenges under the Clause, claiming that their right to a
republican form of government has been abridged, it is hardly
surprising to watch courts refusing to entertain such discussions and
leaving such guarantees to the political processes. Surely, much of
253. Redish, Federal Courts, supra n. 23, at 12-13.
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what republicanism means is that the populace is supposed to make its
preferences known through electing a representative legislature, 254 and
it is the legislatures' responsibility to be responsive to popular
concerns. If they fail, it is largely the responsibility of citizens to "take
up arms against [their] sea of troubles" and by voting against the
representatives, "end them." 2 55 To be sure, there will be breakdowns
in this idealized version of electoral politics, and it would only then be
appropriate for the Court to step in. And the jurisprudence-or lack
thereof-of the Guarantee Clause tends to err in favor of the electoral
process.
Most investigations of the history of the Guarantee Clause in the
Court start with Luther v. Borden.2 56 Luther declared in 1849 that
virtually all claims based on the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable,
and the Court has not substantially departed from that pronouncement
to this day. 7 In the context of settling a case and controversy that
could be disposed of only by taking a side in the Rhode Island Dorr
Rebellion of 1842, the Court opted to take itself out of the mediation by
developing a theory of nonjusticiability. The Court would refuse to
decide cases that forced them to navigate between competing theories
of what republicanism means. In Luther, the Court was asked to
determine which government in Rhode Island was legitimate in 1842one based upon a 1663 charter from King Charles II, which severely
malapportioned representatives, or a new constitution adopted outside
the charter process by a popular majority. 2 58 The Court declined to
government,
adjudicate, leaving in power the Freeholder charter
25 9
movement.
Constitutionalist
popular
the
undermining
Though the Taney Court embraced Webster's argument that the
the
case Luther presented was "outside 'judicial cognizance,'
Court left the ultimate decision to the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
leaving the question merely nonjusticiable at the federal level. 26 1 The
'260

254. For the implicit logic of the "structural preferences" strain of republicanism, see
supra notes 77-81, and accompanying text.
255. William Shakespeare, Hamlet Act I11,Scene 1, 127 (Barbara A. Mowat & Paul
Werstine eds., Wash. Square Press 1992).
256. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 47.
Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 117.
Id. at 120.
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decision basically put forth a "political question" rationale, and this has
served as its most durable doctrine, albeit one that is quite irritating to
commentators. Even Woodbury's dissent agreed with the "danger"
associated with the Court's meddling in political matters, such as were
at issue in Luther.26 2 Taney simply felt that "courts are not proper
bodies to choose among competing political theories and impose them
on the states" when the competing theories come directly from the
citizenry. 263 He was insistent that it made no sense for the Court to
adjudicate cases upon which other branches have already spoken. 264 In
the case of Luther, the Dorr Rebellion had taken its course and there
were already pronouncements from the political branches, effectively
26 5
mooting the case before the Court.
Just what the holding of Luther really is-and what is merely
dicta-is too complicated a matter for the present inquiry. However,
the case did take a stand on the important question of just who the
Guarantee Clause was targeted to protect: " '[A]ccording to the
institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every State resides in the
people of the State,' " and not in the State government itself.26 6 Some
commentators try to limit the holding of Luther: "[A] narrower reading
of Luther's holding makes much more sense. The key issue in the case
was not whether the charter regime was Republican, but whether it was
a Government.'' 267 Nonetheless, the subsequent cases do not bear out
this thesis and, much more generally, remove anything that smacks of a
challenge based on a contentious theory of republicanism from the
Court's cognizance.
In 1874, Minor v. Happersett pushed the Court two steps
backward as it recoiled from the radically hands-off nature of
Luther.26 There, the Court claimed to "have unmistakable evidence of
what was republican in form, within the meaning of that term as
employed in the Constitution. ' 2 69 Minor refused women the right to
vote under a theory of republicanism, suggesting outer limits to the

262. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 51 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
263. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 125.
264. Luther, 48 U.S. at 47.
265. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 126.

266.
267.
268.
269.

Amar, supra n. 40, at 777 (citing Luther, 48 U.S. at 47).
Id. at 776 (emphasis added).
88 U.S. 162 (1874).
Id. at 176.
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force of the political question doctrine's exclusion of the judiciary from
positing a theory-in this case an originalist theory-of what the
Guarantee Clause means for individual rights. 27 Nonetheless, the fact
that a citizen brought the action made it easy for the Court to direct
women to the political process to ensure their rights.
The next group of cases in the non-jurisprudence of the Guarantee
Clause emerged during the Progressive Era, as direct democracy took
hold. Since the Guarantee Clause seemed to be adjudicated on an
implicit theory of the separation of powers, questions of delegation
arose as state governments began to employ popular mechanisms to
circumvent the demands of representative government. By allowing
citizens to use the referendum and initiative processes to pass
legislation, Progressives seemed to undermine Madison's explicit
definition of republicanism as representative government. 27 1 If
Minor's originalist theory was to have any bite, surely direct
democracy would
need to be adjudged violative of the republican form
272
of government.

But the Court refused to extend Minor, and instead relied on
Luther to refuse justiciability in the central case that addressed
Progressive forms of government embodied in the referendum and
274
initiative. 27 3 Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon
270. Id. at 177-78.
271. Rice v. Foster, 1847 WL 648, *14 (Del. 1847) (finding that an act that
authorized the people to decide by referendum whether to license the sale of liquor,
"tends to subvert our representative republican form of government").
272. Critics of direct democracy often make this argument. E.g. Hans Linde, On
Reconstituting "Republican Government," 19 Okla. City U.L, Rev. 193 (1994). I
deflect this concern with my propensity to see republicanism as open-ended and as
constantly in the process of being revised. Much of the logic for representative
government relied on the intellectual virtues and the propertied-hence incorruptiblenature of representatives. Surely, circumstances have changed enough to cause us to
reassess just how central representative government is to republicanism. I mean to say
that it continues to be central, just not in all contexts such that we need to do away with
all versions of direct democracy. See Leib, supra n. 35, at 400-01 (for a version of
what would be an appropriate mixed regime of representative and direct democracy).
273. There were many state challenges that were also refused. See e.g. Ark. v.
Nichols, 26 Ark. 74 (1870); Denver v. Sours, 74 P. 167 (Colo. 1903); Village of
SaratogaSprings v. SaratogaGas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 83 N.E. 693 (N.Y. 1908);
Eckerson v. City of Des Moines, 115 N.W. 177 (Iowa 1908); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. GreenbrierDistillery Co., 187 S.W. 296 (Ky. 1916); Santee Mills v. Query,
115 S.E. 202 (S.C. 1922); La. v. Smith, 166 So. 72 (La. 1935); Minn. v. Quinlivan, 268
N.W. 858 (Minn. 1936); In re Interrogs. of the Gov., 65 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1937). Some
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drew heavily upon Luther's political question doctrine to allow the
Court to recuse itself from deciding what constitutes a republican form
of government, even though there was substantial historical evidence2 in
75
the words of the Framers recommending against direct democracy.
Of course, Minor is bad law for a number of reasons, but PacificStates
further forecloses reliance on Minor for the proposition that the original
intent of the Guarantee Clause is dispositive in judicial contexts.
In Colegrove v. Green,276 Frankfurter made the most overt
proclamation with the regard to the Guarantee Clause yet, generally
denying justiciability by stating, "[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a
republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the
courts. '

2 77

It is plain that the Court has held Guarantee Clause claims

nonjusticiable as political questions in a variety of different kinds of
cases. 278 But this raises the question of whether Guarantee Clause
claims are inherently nonjusticiable, or whether it is the political
questions they often raise that makes them so.
Baker v. Carranswers this
, question, suggesting the
279 latter, scaling
back from Frankfurter's monolithic view of the clause.
The holding
of Baker is that Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable because
they raise political questions upon which the Court is resistant to make
pronouncements: "Guaranty Clause claims involve those elements
which define a 'political question,' andfor that reason and no other,
they are nonjusticiable .... [T]he nonjusticiability of such claims has

state courts, however, "pointed to the wide variations in local government at the time
the Constitution was adopted and concluded that the clause neither restricts the form of
local government nor limits the degree of popular direct participation in city or county
government." Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 259 (citing Eckerson v. City of Des Moines, 115
N.W. 177 (Iowa 1908); People v. Edmands, 96 N.E. 914 (I11. 1911); Walker v.
Spokane, 113 P. 775 (Wash. 1911); City of Jackson v. Miss., 59 S. 873 (Miss. 1912);
Hile v. City of Cleveland, 141 N.E. 35 (Ohio 1923); Sarlls v. Ind, 166 N.E. 270 (Ind.
1929)).
274. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
275. Id. at 147.
276. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
277. Id. at 556.
278. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (challenging
delegation to agencies); Cochran v La. St. Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374 (1930)
(challenging taxation); Mt. Timber Co. v. Wash., 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917) (challenging
worker's compensation); Ohio v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (challenging
referendums).
279. 369 U.S. 186, 218 (1962).
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nothing to do with their touching upon matters of state governmental
organization. "280 In one fell swoop, the Court settles the question of
why the judiciary doesn't hear Guarantee Clause claims and further
indicates that federalism concerns are not central to their analysis-a
point to which we will need to return.
Here are the standards Baker set for determining when a question
is too political for the Court to get its hands dirty:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political

question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various
28 1
departments on one question.

2 82
We can surely quibble with just how useful this definition is.
It does seem absurdly overinclusive, since many challenges heard
before the Court are precisely the ones where the Court must discover
and manage their own standards, and must encroach upon the political
branches' textually granted powers because the branches overreach.
Nonetheless, the Court delimited the per se version of nonjusticiability
by providing standards to determine what counts as a political question.
This leaves open the possibility that the Court would find some
Guarantee Clause claims justiciable. Reynolds v. Sims noted that only
"some questions raised under the Guarantee Clause are
nonjusticiable. ' 2 83
But that open possibility has never been fruitfully utilized. Fastforward thirty years to New York v. United States.284 There, Justice
O'Connor countenanced a Guarantee Clause claim, only to dismiss it

280. Id. at 218.
281. Id. at217.
282. E.g. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A NeoFederalistApproach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393,497-511 (1996).
283. 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964).

284. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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summarily. 28 5 Although noting that the presumption in favor of
nonjusticiability "has not always been accepted," she only proceeds by
286
Indeed, this is
assuming justiciability without actually conferring it.
the current state of the Guarantee Clause: Whenever it gets addressed,
courts qualify their jurisdictional authority over the matter either by
including in their discussion the disclaimer, "[e]ven assuming the
justiciability [of the Clause]," 2 87 or they take the "assuming, arguendo,
claim" posture. 28s Then
that [the litigant] has presented a justiciable
289
violation.
a
find
to
refuse
they universally
B. THE COMMENTARY-"WE WANT JUSTICIABILITY... AND WE
"
WANT IT NoW.

Given the active (if not repetitive) discussion of justiciability in
the courts, it is no surprise to see lawyers focused on this very question.
Commentators try to find a class of questions that could be held to be
justiciable, or try to undermine the political question doctrine to expand
this class much more broadly. The general hope for a jurisprudence of
the Guarantee Clause is likely to continue to fail, if scholars can find no
more creative way to approach the problem than by telling the courts
over and over again, "No, you have it wrong. The Guarantee Clause is
justiciable-and here's what I think it means you need to start doing."
One of the more modest attacks targeted to undo the Clause's
"desuetude" as it succumbs to nonjusticiability is to provide a theory of
why and how the Guarantee Clause in particular should be held to be
285. Id. at 184.
286. Id. at 184-85 (claiming that "in a group of cases decided before the holding of
Luther was elevated into a general rule of nonjusticiability, the Court addressed the
merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause without any suggestion that the
claims were not justiciable") (citing Mich. v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905);
Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
563-64, (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding racial segregation "inconsistent with the
guarantee given by the Constitution to each State of a republican form of
government"); Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1891); Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. 162, 175-76 (1874)).
287. See City ofN.Y. v. U.S., 179 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1999); see e.g. U.S. v. Vazquez,
145 F.3d 74, 84 (2d Cir. 1998); Padavan v. U.S., 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996);
Bowman v. City of Indianapolis, 927 F. Supp. 309, 312 (S.D. Ind. 1996); U.S. W.
Commun., Inc. v. MF.S. Intelenet, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1232 (D. Or. 1998);
Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 71 (D.D.C. 2000).
288. Cal. v. U.S., 104 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997).
289. For examples of the refusals to find violations, see supra notes 284-86.
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justiciable. 290 This approach is by far the most common in the
secondary literature. 291 By redescribing the holdings of the various
central cases that serve as the most controlling precedents, scholars are
able to downplay the Court's historical commitment to
nonjusticiability. For example, Amar reads that the central question of
Luther "was akin to the international question of 'recognition'-a
question committed to the federal political branches under our
Constitution. ' ' 292 In this act of rereading, he is able to mitigate its
holding, directing the current Court to find the Clause justiciable,
provided the case or controversy does not raise this particularly sticky
question of recognition. Also, Amar suggests that "[a] Supreme Court
that saw what happened to a President who challenged Congress's
theory of the [Guarantee] Clause took pains to avert a showdown of its
own with Congress-and even years later, would reflexively jerk away
from any case implicating this dangerous clause." 2 93 By telling his
story of the triumph of nonjusticiability as historically contingent and
not as having emerged from faithful adherence to Luther, he is able to
cast some doubt on whether the Court should press forward with its
general policy of nonjusticiability.
Another argument regularly launched highlights how "other big
clauses," notably the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause, have the same expansive "potential breadth" as the Guarantee
Clause. 29 4 By emphasizing the obvious flexibility of the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses, these scholars are able to show just how
odd it is that the Court wants to claim that there is something particular
290. See generally Bonfield, supra n. 5, at 513.
291. Ely, supra n. 5, at 118 (arguing for justiciability broadly in reapportionment
cases); Bork, supra n. 5, at 18-19; Seeley, supra n. 5, at 905-10 (arguing for
justiciability in cases of bad outcomes of direct democracy, directly contradicting the
holding of Pacific States); Smith, supra n. 5, at 565-80 (recommending justiciability
when a state violates its own laws); Berg, supra n. 5, at 209 (arguing that "[t]he
Guarantee Clause should be the basis for enforcing the nondelegation principle against
the states"). Farber, Eskridge, & Frickey, supra n. 198, at 959-63 (suggesting that even
in the best case scenario, only state courts will enforce state versions of the doctrine).
Accordingly, some scholars argue that it is upon state courts to confer justiciability.
E.g. Edward A. Stelzer, Bearing the Judicial Mantle: State Court Enforcement of the
Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 870, 887-94 (1993).
292. Amar, supra n. 40, at 776; but see Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the
Guarantee Clause, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 887, 928-31 (1994).
293. Amar, supra n. 40, at 780.
294. Id. at 753.
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about the Guarantee Clause that resists the potential for manageable
and discoverable judicial standards. Redish puts it nicely:
Over a period of many years, the Supreme Court has developed
numerous specific principles of personal jurisdiction and concepts
of fair procedure without the slightest hint of guidance from either
the language or history of the Due Process Clause. Similarly, the
Court has adopted shifting standards of scrutiny under the [E]qual
[P]rotection [C]lause that find little or no basis in the vague terms
of that provision .... The dubious nature of the "absence of
standards" view is illustrated by Justice Brennan's opinion in
Baker[,] ... where he suggested that a constitutional challenge to
state gerrymandering pursuant to Article IV's Guarantee Clause
would be dismissed for lack of susceptibility to workable judicial
standards, though a similar challenge brought under the [E]qual
[P]rotection95 [C]lause somehow failed to present the same
2
difficulty.
Redish makes clear that indeterminacy is no reason to find the
clause nonjusticiable. He continues: "Ultimately, any constitutional
provision can be supplied with working standards of interpretation. To
be sure, those standards often will not clearly flow from either the
distinguish
language or history of the provision, but that fact does 29not
6
day."
every
invoked
standards
them from many judicial
Yet another strategy to claim justiciability for the Guarantee
Clause is by contradicting the argument occasionally propounded by
the Court that the Clause's positioning in Article V somehow removes
it from the scope of judicial review. Since the guarantee is to be
provided by the "United States," the Court sometimes suggests that this
excludes the provision from judicial review. There are even prominent
scholars who find this structural argument appealing:
[Louis] Henkin believes that Luther can properly be grounded on
the view that the phrase "the United States shall guarantee," in
Article IV, "plausibly refers to the political branches, and it is not
295. Redish, Federal Courts, supra n. 23, at 122 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Intl. Shoe Co. v. Wa., 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
Martin Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and PersonalJurisdiction: A Theoretical
Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112 (1981)); but see Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (where Justice Scalia makes an argument from original intent
about transient personal jurisdiction).
296. Redish, Federal Courts, supra n. 23, at 123.
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implausible to read it as excluding monitoring and enforcement by
the courts. If so, we may have a unique constitutional clause
297
excluding the courts."
However, Redish is probably right when he argues that "[t]here
is ... absolutely nothing in the text of the [G]uarantee [C]lause to
distinguish the relevance of judicial review from any other
provision." 2 98 The powers of Congress enumerated in Article I,
Section Eight include no provision for judicial review, and there is no
reason to limit the holding of Marbury v. Madison to shield the
Guarantee Clause from judicial monitoring.2 99 Looking to the logic of
Crowell v. Benson, 3° ° Redish notes more forcefully that the strictures
of the separation of powers are ultimately judicial questions, so the
appeal to the political question doctrine to avoid making
determinations may itself be violative of a republican form of
government. 30 1 Indeed, a republican form of government may require
judicial review. Again, though, the problem with this attack is that the
Court is quite unsympathetic and is still basically committed to a form
of nonj usticiability.
The hesitation about the political question doctrine itself leads
some to make an oblique attack on nonjusticiability by trying to
discredit the doctrine in its entirety, and through it, the claims of
nonjusticiability. 3° 2 Indeed, the repudiation of the political question
doctrine is one of Redish's primary agenda. He claims "once we make
the initial assumption that judicial review plays a legitimate role in a
constitutional democracy, we must abandon the political question
doctrine, in all its manifestations." 3° 3 This would lead to justiciability
if the Court were to abandon its rather well-established political
question doctrine.
We should of course view this ambitious approach with fair
pessimism, despite the fact that Justices Blackmun and White once
bought the argument. 3° 4 Though we may be able to show that in the

297. Id. at 117 (quoting Henkin, supra n. 23, at 609).

298. Id.
299. 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).

300. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
301.
302.
303.
304.

Redish, FederalCourts, supra n. 23, at 117.
E.g. Weinberg, supra n. 292, at 294.
Redish, FederalCourts, supra n. 23, at 134.
See Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 239-52 (1993) (White & Blackmun, JJ.,
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political question jurisprudence "the Court is likely motivated more by
the prudential policy considerations to which ...Bickel has pointed
than it is by the desire to maintain rigid adherence to precedent," we
are still unlikely to be able to uproot the entrenchment of this most
significant "passive virtue." 30 5 Even by showing that a denial of
justiciability based on a political question is just as much a policy
decision as a conferral of justiciability, 30 6 the Court is unlikely to veer
from its political question course. 30 Moreover, if it merely takes
jurisdiction and grants the point of justiciability without ever finding a
violation, as it seems to be doing now, those who care more
particularly about the Guarantee Clause will win a Pyrrhic victory in
getting jurisdiction without getting the Court to protect republicanism
actively.
This brings us to the other strain of the scholarship, which aims to
tell the Court just what sort of values it should be looking to enforce
under the authority of the Clause. We could devote volumes to
summarizing recent prominent arguments in the field.308 Instead, let
me merely list some of the suggestions put forth. Amar thinks that
"popular sovereignty" is the key to republicanism and the courts ought
to start enforcing defects in majority rule. 3 09 And how replacing the
words "popular sovereignty" for a "republican form of government"
concurring).
305. Redish, Federal Courts, supra n. 23, at 114 (citing Bickel, Least Dangerous,
supra n. 24, at 183-98).
306. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 126-27; compare Henkin, supra n. 23, at 606 (arguing
that in the political question cases the Court "is not refusing to pass on the power of the
political branches; it passes upon it, only to affirm that they had the power when it had
been challenged and that nothing in the Constitution prohibited the particular exercise
of it"); Wayne McCormack, The Political Question Doctrine-Jurisprudentially, 70 U.
Det. Mercy L. Rev. 793, 821-22 (1993) (arguing that the doctrine is a myth because
any pronouncement of nonjusticiability is itself an act of judicial review) with Redish,
Federal Courts, supra n. 23, at 116, 129 (arguing that it is still preferable for the Court
to take jurisdiction and then to defer to the (other) political branches).
307. Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the
Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 643, 650-68 (1989). Perhaps Barkow
is right that the doctrine really is on the decline. Barkow, supra n. 23, at 242. Perhaps
after Bush v. Gore, there is no longer such a thing as a political question that the
Supreme Court won't touch.
308. Some of these volumes may be found in supra note 291, and its accompanying
text.
309. Compare Amar, supra n. 40, at 749 with G. Edward White, Reading the
Guarantee Clause, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 787, 787 (1994) (criticizing the view).
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helps us clarify our standards is, of course, a question for another time.
Hans Linde and Julian Eule think that the Guarantee Clause should
serve as a shield against bad referendum outcomes. 3 1 How this
squares with Pacific States is for another essay. Erwin Chemerinsky
launches an argument suggesting that not only should Guarantee
Clause claims be justiciable, but also that determinations about whether
a state's practices deny a republican form of government are
exclusively judicial questions. 3 11 His argument proceeds by syllogism:
"federal courts should enforce individual rights; the Guarantee Clause
embodies individual rights; therefore the federal courts should enforce
the Guarantee Clause. ''3 12 Yet there is no intuitive reason to give the
Guarantee Clause the substance of individual rights (whatever these
may amount to), instead of concentrating on republican forms. 3 13 Of
course, I hope my outline of republicanism here might help fill the gaps
in these various suggestions without embracing the exclusive focus on
courts. It suffices to note that "[a]ll four of the main papers presented
at [the recent conference on the Guarantee Clause] argue from highly
310. Compare Hans Linde, Who Is Responsiblefor Republican Government?, 65 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 709, 713-31 (1994); Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State
Courts, Voter Initiatives,and the Threat of ElectoralReprisal,65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 733,
733-40 (1994) with Jesse Choper, Observations on the Guarantee Clause-As
Thoughtfully Addressed by Justice Linde and Professor Eule, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 741,
741-42 (1994).
311. Compare Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be
Justiciable,65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 849, 850-51 (1994) with Ann Althouse, Time for the
Federal Courts to Enforce the Guarantee Clause?-A Response to Professor
Chemerinsky, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 881, 881-82 (1994).
312. See generally Althouse, supra, n. 311 at 881 (discussing Chemerinsky, supra n.
311).
313. Id. Althouse opines:
Professor Chemerinsky's theory shows the Court a way to become an activist
in a new area, but ignores the real problem: [W]here is the pressing need for
the Court to act? With respect to the problem of malapportionment, the
Fourteenth Amendment has already relieved the pressure. With respect to
monarchies and anarchies, the problems, purely hypothetical and entirely
remote, exert no pressure. (Moreover, as Professor Chemerinsky recognizes,
it is in such "egregious cases" that we can rely on Congress to enforce the
Clause.) The problem of legislation by referendum simply does not excite
the same sense of urgency as racial malapportionment. To the extent that a
particular referendum produces a law that injures a politically powerless or
unpopular minority, the easier path to remedy, if the Court seeks one,
remains the same as the remedy for the same law passed through
representative channels: [I]t can simply find that the law violates equal
protection or some other individual right.
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conventional assumptions about text, history, and judicial role to
conclude that the courts should enforce the Guarantee Clause." 314
The federalist focus of some of the recent Guarantee Clause
literature, however, cannot merely be glossed over. If Deborah Jones
Merritt is right that state sovereignty is the implicit protection of the
Guarantee Clause, 3 15 my attempt here to find a federal legislative
power in the Clause is rendered moot. Another difficulty with trying to
ignore Merritt's theory that the Clause guarantees to states the integrity
of their own lawmaking processes is that the Court, when addressing
Guarantee Clause claims, cites Merritt as the primary authority on the
Clause's meaning, not a big surprise given the Court's neo-federalist
tendencies. 3 16 Therefore, instead of picking apart the federalist
argument by criticizing Merritt's various moves to replace the words
"republican form of government" with a robust guarantee of "state
sovereignty," the final part of this article will make the affirmative
argument in favor of seeing in the Clause a federal power, as opposed

Id. at 883-84. Of course, as I argue, the Lopez and Boerne line of cases present a new
urgency for a Guarantee Clause jurisprudence.
314. Robert F. Nagel, Terminator2, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 843, 843 (1994).
315. E.g. Merritt, supra n. 5, at 22-50; Merritt, supra n. 247, at 827-32; Laurence H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-23, 398 (2d ed., Found. Press 1988) (noting
that, although the Guarantee Clause does not protect individuals, it may confer
"judicially enforceable rights upon states as states"); Jonathon K. Waldrop, Student
Author, Rousing the Sleeping Giant? Federalism and the Guarantee Clause, 15 J. L.
& Pol. 267, 299-307 (1999) (arguing for the neo-federalist view as descriptive of the
Court's likely reading).
316. N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (citing Merritt, supra n. 5, at 3-10;
Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) as incorporating federalist structure into republicanism).
There are other courts sympathetic to neo-republicanism: E.g. Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d
843, 858-59 (9th Cir. 1997) (endorsing Merritt's theory of the federalist principles
implicit in the Guarantee Clause); Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 774 (7th Cir.
1988) (endorsing federalist principles implicit in the Guarantee Clause, though not
embracing federal judicial review); Gordon v. Griffith, 88 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43-44
(E.D.N.Y. 2000). The Printz Court's pronouncement on the matter is illustrative:
Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal
Government, they retained "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty." This is
reflected throughout the Constitution's text, including.., the Guarantee
Clause, Art. IV, § 4, which "presupposes the continued existence of the states
and ... those means and instrumentalities which are the creation of their
sovereign and reserved rights."
521 U.S. at 918-19 (1997) (citations omitted).

HeinOnline -- 24 Whittier L. Rev. 202 2002-2003

2002]

REDEEMING THE WELSHED GUARANTEE

to a limit thereupon. 3 17 This argument will be at once practical, as it is
based on a simple reading of the major cases and history associated
with the Clause, as well as theoretical, as it is based on the version of
republicanism endorsed here, that of the possibility for the dignity of
legislation in contestatory deliberation.
VI. THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE AS A REPUBLICAN SWORD?
The central difficulty with any project seeking to find in the
Guarantee Clause a robust federal power is that "the Guarantee Clause
has been ...regarded by the Court more as a shield for the states than
as a sword for Congress. ' 3 18 Nevertheless, given the Court's longterm commitment to nonjusticiability, and its overt statements
conferring upon Congress the right to act under the Clause, a
persuasive case can be made that the Clause is a sword to be used to
address the sort of legislative concerns I argued for in Part IV. As long
'319
as Congress does not " 'commandeer' state resources or authority, ,
federalism ought not intrude upon this near plenary power ' given
to
32
Congress, a power Charles Sumner called the "sleeping giant. 0
When Chemerinsky makes his argument for justiciability, he goes
further than necessary to rule out a role for the Congress in redeeming
the welshed guarantee. 32 1 He argues that without justiciability "the
Clause only has meaning if either the President or Congress is likely to
be willing and able to enforce the provision. Such is certainly not the
case.'322 But it is precisely because justiciability is the focus of the
Guarantee Clause cases and literature that lawyers spend more time
explaining to courts what they ought to do under the Clause than they
do telling Congress just what a broad power it has at its disposal. He is
quite aware that "[a]s early as 1916, the Court said: 'As has been
317. See Althouse, supra n. 311, at 851; Kathryn Abrams, No "There" There: State
Autonomy and Voting Rights Regulation, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 835, 841 (1994).
318. Coffee, supra n. 5, at 457.
319. Id. (citing the federalism line of cases for the "commandeering" limitation on
federal power enunciated in N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. at 185-86). Obviously, this might
present difficulty for the abrogation of sovereign immunity argued for in Part IV, but
since it is reasonable to think that the Guarantee Clause powers give Congress some
right of constitutional interpretation, it may in good faith abrogate immunity for a
state's failure to provide a republican form of government.
320. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 2.
321. Chemerinsky, supra n. 311, at 875-78.
322. Id. at 875.
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decided repeatedly, the question whether this guaranty has been
violated is not a judicial but a political question, committed to
Congress and not the courts.' "323 He nonetheless urges against relying
on Congress. 324 Noting the obvious federalism concerns, he still has
some faith that Tenth and Eleventh Amendment problems might be
circumvented by being careful not to replicate the scheme of New York.
But his central concern is basically the curse of history: "Two
hundred years of experience demonstrates that such actions [of
Congress invoking the Guarantee Clause] are not likely
forthcoming. ' 3 25 Of course, forty years of whining to get justiciability
has not been very successful either. Moreover, the cases demonstrate
that if lawyers want to heed their courts' directives, they will begin to
focus on suggesting to Congress that they act under the Clause, and not
wait for their judges to take their suggestions. I suspect that if
Congress acts, the Court will pay much closer attention to the Clause
than if we succeed in getting one more symposium urging justiciability.
We cannot even agree on these "judicially manageable standards," the
only thing we seem to agree about is that there are some. This Part will
show that focusing the Guarantee Clause discourse upon congressional
action is warranted by history and cases. It is, thus, a shame to see so
few commentators attempt to use it in the way I envision-and even
when they do, their proposals are quite modest.
A. CASES AND HISTORYARMING CONGRESS WITH THE SWORD
The evidence to support the Guarantee Clause's furnishing
Congress with a positive power predates Luther's nonjusticiability
doctrine. Indeed, the document itself recommends that entirety 32of6
Article IV was meant to discuss the federal power quite broadly.
Though surely not intended to rest the Guarantee Clause power
exclusively with the Congress, for then we would no doubt see it
appear in Article I, Congress certainly may not be excluded from the
party vested with Guarantee Clause power, "the United States." And,
powers granted by the document are
of course, since all legislative
327
vested in the Congress,
we can imagine a Congress passing laws
under the authority of Article IV. I should note explicitly that there
may also be a presidentialpower lodged in the Clause. While that
323. Id. (quoting Mt. Timber Co. v. Wash., 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1916)).
324. Id. at 876-77.
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facet of the Clause also might be worth investigating, I limit my
treatment here to Congress, a site
particularly amenable to the theories
32 g
of republicanism explored here.
The Framers' thoughts, unsurprisingly, cohered with the idea
expressed in the document. In reaction to the extralegal violence
perpetrated by Shays' Rebellion, the Framers acutely felt the weakness
of the Articles of Confederation. 329 Thus, when Madison was to
present his Virginia Plan, the Guarantee Clause was part of his larger
program to give the federal government some constitutional authority
to provide help to the states. 33 Surely, this posture suggests that the
Clause was meant to benefit the states in some way, but it was
primarily dressed as a federal power, the legislative aspect of which
resided in Congress. Indeed, the Domestic Violence Clause serves as a
"repressive or negative guarantee," whereas that Guarantee Clause
itself serves as a positive prophylactic. 33 1 The Federalistalso lends
support to this reading. When exploring the "defects" of the Articles,
Hamilton writes:
Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in
repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten
the existence of State constitutions, must be renounced.
Usurpation may rear its crest in each State and trample upon the
liberties of the people, while the national government could
legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments ....332
Though obviously having in mind the dangers of domestic
violence, the liberty of the people is his primary concern, along with
the want of a federal power to legislate in service of the protection of
that liberty. And he is quite clear that state sovereignty, "[t]he
inordinate pride of State importance," is hardly the linchpin: "A
325. Id. at 878.
326. U.S. Const. art IV.
327. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1 (stating that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States").
328. This is explored in supra notes 22, 141-61, and accompanying text. Part III
argues why Congress in particular is a good site for debates about what republicanism
requires. Here I am trying to justify congressional powers.
329. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 33-50.
330. Id. at41-42.
331. Id. at 59 (invoking James Wilson's formulation that was actually adopted at the
Convention).
332. Alexander Hamilton, The FederalistNo. XXI,supra n. 19, at vol. 1, 135, 136.
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scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal advantages
to be expected from union[.], 333 While trying to delimit the guarantee
to "changes [effected] by violence," Hamilton's approach lends support
to a much broader federal power "against the usurpations of rulers as
against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the
community.
Though surely not countenancing federal
antidiscrimination law, Hamilton's argument could be read quite
liberally to sanction action against state laws that are enacted with
"fiscal violence," for example, tyrannizing powerless minorities by
outspending them in campaigns. Just as such sanctions could be
enforced through courts, so could they be enforced through federal
legislation.
Madison's approach is more deferential to the Anti-federalists in
trying to downplay the significance of the Clause.3 35 But he is
nonetheless concerned about "experiments [that] may be produced by
the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterrising leaders,
or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers[.] ' 33 6 While trying
to allay the fears of those who worry about the abdication of state
sovereignty, Madison avers that the guarantee will protect the states, in
the forms that they enter the union, acknowledging that there are a
variety of acceptable republicanforms.3 37 But he nevertheless goes
beyond the formal protection to allow for federal intrusion on a state's
sovereignty if the state government is not "substantiallymaintained" as
a republic. 33 8 By providing the federal government (in an Article of
the Constitution that mentions the "Legislature" and the "Executive"
but not the courts) with an enforcement mechanism that looks to
333. Id. at 137.
334. Id. (emphasis added).
335. Keeping in mind the context of the Federalisthelps us understand that we are
likely to see Madison, Hamilton, and Jay playing to the state sovereignty folks, while
subversively arguing for the need to compromise that sovereignty in service of the
union.
336. Madison, The FederalistNo. XLIII, supra n. 19, at vol 1,298.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 297. Substance and form will always be a slippery slope and I do not
think I can do justice to the task of separating them out here. In Part IV, I gave some
reason to believe that the legislation proposed there meets the test of being about a
form of government. I don't think my treatment there is wholly adequate, but then I'm
not trying to delineate precisely the contours of the Clause's ambit. Nor, it should be
mentioned, is it at all clear that Madison had in mind the form-substance debate as it is
played out in contemporary jurisprudence.
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substance and not merely to form, Madison equips the Congress with a
sword to maintain substantial republican principles, not merely the
structural preference for representation. This is quite different from
has been adjudged
Congress's Section Five enforcement power, which
339
to disallow substantive legislation after Boerne.
However, after ratifying the Clause under the force of various
arguments sanctioning federal power (and in particular note that in
none of the Federalist discussions is justiciability or judicial
construction of the Clause very important), authorities confer upon the
Clause "a repressive aura." 34 The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 links
the Clause with its section-mate, the Domestic Violence Clause, as an
indirect result of the Militia Act of 1792 and its progeny, the
Enforcement Act of1795.34 1 As Weicek has argued it:
[The Acts were] interpreted ... as a delegation of congressional
power to the President to enforce at least part of Section [IV]'s
guarantee. Although it was based only on the [D]omestic
[V]iolence [C]lause, Chief Justice Roger Taney read this statute as
if it also controlled342 the allocation of authority under the
[G]uarantee [C]lause.
The Act is "the basic authority for federal control of state military
forces." 34 3 By treating Article 1V, Section Four as a congressional
power, the Act, which is still in force today, 34 4 lends support to treating
the Guarantee Clause as conferring upon Congress the power to pass
legislation-particularly against states as states.
Luther further entrenches this theory. It quite overtly "stresse[s]
the special role of the nonjudicial branches of the federal government
in implementing this Clause." 345 Whether the argument proves
coherent that the judiciary is effectively taken out of the Clause with
the locution that it is the "United States" that shall provide for the
guarantee-and I suspect it probably is not-Luther does make this

339. E.g. Kimel v. Fla.Bd of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000) (declaring portions
of the ADEA to be an invalid exercise of § 5 power).
340. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 81.
341. Id. at 78-110.
342. Id. at 81.
343. Id.
344. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332 (2000); Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 81.
345. Amar, supra n. 40, at 780.
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broad-ranging proclamation. 346
Redish puts to rest Henkin's
suggestion that "the Luther decision gave [the political branches] no
extra-ordinary deference." 347 Redish argues that "Henkin's analysis
amounts to little more than a play on words. ' 348 The Guarantee
Clause, as read by Luther, "vest[s] in the political branches of the
federal government exclusive authority to interpret the meaning of and
to enforce that provision. ' 34 9 To be sure, Luther emphasizes a
presidential power precisely because Congress had supposedly
delegated the power in the Militia Act, but in such a recognition is also
the implicit argument that Congress had the authority to so delegate.
In the wake of the Dorr Rebellion and Congress's discussions of
it is also recognition of congressional authority. The majority report in
Congress notes that the "[G]uarantee [C]lause gives Congress 'a
supervision over all the state constitutions, so far as the ascertainment
of their republican character is concerned,' including the power to 'set
aside' those constitutions not reflective of the popular will." 350 The
majority condemned President Tyler for not supporting Dorr, but the
House did not care about what the committee reported and the idea to
pass this reading of the Guarantee Clause into law died along with
interest in the Dorr Rebellion. 3 5 1
What remains is Taney's
relinquishment of the Guarantee Power to the Congress, even if the
Congress would not ultimately take responsibility for the mooted
question.
Reconstruction presented its own opportunity for congressional
exercise of power under the Clause. 352 Of course, the need for the
Clause was mooted by the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
Congress nevertheless looked to the Clause to assert its authority over
the states.
Charles Sumner-the Clause's greatest championrecognized that reading the states' secession as a de facto forfeiture of
346. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1849).
347. Henkin, supra n. 23, at 608.
348. Redish, Federal Courts, supra n. 23, at 115.
349. Id.
350. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 109 (citations omitted).
351. Id. at 109-10.
352. To be sure, Lincoln might have used the presidential aspect of the Clause.
Executive review more generally may have a textual basis in the Guarantee Clause as
well. But, again, here I am most interested in the congressional uses because it is
Congress that is most well suited to act in service of republican ends, subject to
republican procedures.
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states' rights would help trigger the Guarantee Clause more easily, but
he was nonetheless committed to its use even if the forfeiture theory
wouldn't hold. 35 3 He pressed the Clause upon Congress, urging it to
354
act under the broad powers granted by it.
The cause was taken up
by Henry Winter Davis. Davis argued:
[The Clause] vests in the Congress of the United States a plenary,
supreme, unlimited political jurisdiction, paramount over courts,
subject only to the judgment of the people of the United States,
embracing within its scope every legislative measure necessary
and proper to make it effectual; and what is necessary and proper
the Constitution refers in the first Jlace to our judgment, subject to
no revision but that of the people. 35
Ultimately Congress took no specific action under the Clause but
did want to take power away from the President's use of the Clause to
protect the Southern states. During the Reconstruction, Northerners
tried to read a formal "Equal Protection" provision into the Clause
under William Goodell, "the foremost antislavery expositor of the
Guarantee Clause.",3 56 And slavery's role in republicanism was
debated quite actively during Reconstruction along with
357 Congress's
powers over the states they viewed as unrepublican.
Of course,
arguments were launched on both sides, with Democrats taking the
neo-federalist position that self-government afforded by the guarantee
requires a protection of state sovereignty. 3 58 However-and this is
most important for my purposes here-the debates were not centralized
on the problem of judicial review. Instead, the Congress debated what
its own powers were under the Clause. Though the debate was
ultimately inconclusive-and did not need resolution owing to the
newfound Fourteenth Amendment powers-during the passage of the
Civil Rights Bill, for example, representatives
overtly relied on the
35 9
sword that they believed inhered in the Clause.
But by 1867, even Republicans shied away from the Clause,
noticing that Democrats were making their own attempt to use the
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 176.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 185 (quoting Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 82-85 (1864)).
Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 160.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 200.
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Clause. 36 Nevertheless, "[a]s J.A.J. Creswell of Maryland explained,
it was clear that the Tenth Amendment could not override the powers
confided to Congress by the Guarantee Clause." 36 1 Federalism wasn't
what stood in the way of the congressional power afforded by the
Clause. As Sumner put it, "[t]here is no clause which36gives
to
2
Congress such supreme power over the states as that clause."
A series of cases further entrenched the idea of granting Congress
the affirmative power to say what republicanism requires of the states,
emasculating the neo-federalist reading of the Clause. In Georgia v.
Stanton,3 63 Texas v. White, 364 and White v. Hart,365 the Court left to
Congress the central power to enact the protections of the Clause. By
emphasizing that the states are only to be thought of as the people of
the states for the purposes of the Clause, the Court encouraged the
political questions raised by the Reconstruction to be addressed 3 in
66
Congress, without the worry of overreaching into state sovereignty.
Justice Chase wrote in Texas that "the power to carry into effect the
clause of guaranty is primarily a legislative power, and resides in
Congress." 67
In the 1870s, when the Congress needed to take a stand about the
Louisiana brouhaha between Kellogg and McEnery, where both
wanted to control allocation of electoral votes in the College, Congress
was willing to delegate its authority to President Grant. 36 Grant was
happy to leave the controversy to the state courts, which allowed9
36
Kellogg to prevail, who in turn granted the electoral votes to Grant.
The once Radical Republicans ultimately abandoned the Clause,
acknowledging that the Clause gave a power "too great" to the federal
government. 37 Nonetheless, by acquiescing to Grant's decisioneven though his decision was a further delegation-Congress indirectly
360. Id. at 203.
361. Id. at 204. As I argued earlier, neither should the Eleventh Amendment.
362. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 214 (quoting Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614
(1867)).
363. 73 U.S. 50 (1867).
364. 74 U.S. 700 (1868).
365. 80 U.S. 646 (1871).
366. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 235.
367. Tx. v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 730 (1868).

368. See Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 225.
369. Id. at 230.
370. Id. at 229.
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allowed the federal government to exercise the very power at issue.
They even went further, arguing that " '[w]hen the frauds committed
are so glaring and widespread as to create public discontent in the state
...this power of the National Government must.., be regarded as
wise and salutary.' ,371
Even in Minor, where the Court ignored its precedent in Luther,
which would have recommended dismissing the case for want of
justiciability, the Court upheld the portion of Luther that conferred
upon Congress the exclusive right to act under the Clause. 37 2 In
deciding Minor's claim on the merits, the Court still noted that it is
371. Id. at 228 (quoting Sen. Rpt. 42-457, ser. 1549 (Jan. 16,1873)). A different
Louisiana brouhaha also provided an opportunity for use of the Clause in the 1930s.
Kurland tells the story:
President Roosevelt watched as Long's corrupt and dictatorial actions
continued on such a grand scale that representative government in Louisiana
was probably lost. Aside from the ever present corruption, Long, as U.S.
Senator and not a holder of any official state office, may have outdone even
himself when he "sheparded" forty-four bills through the Louisiana
legislature in one memorable 1934 special legislative session. The situation
only seemed to worsen as Long's national stature continued to grow.
In 1935, President Roosevelt, seeking new ideas to address the Louisiana
situation, asked the Justice Department to research whether the [G]uarantee
[C]lause could be used as a constitutional vehicle to reestablish normal
civilian rule in Louisiana and to justify broad congressional action to check
tyranny and corruption there as well. A series of memoranda prepared for
President Roosevelt by Alexander Holtzoff of the Justice Department
analyzed the historical scope of the [Gluarantee [C]lause, and noted that "the
framers.., nowhere defined the term 'republican form of government' in
connection with the guaranty." Holtzoff's conclusion was general, noting
that the President had the authority to act alone if it was necessary to call out
federal troops, but he suggested that "cooperation on the part of Congress
would be required" if any more comprehensive federal action was undertaken
pursuant to the [G]uarantee [C]lause. Such action would have included any
proposed congressional attempt to legislate against state and local corruption.
President Roosevelt was intrigued by the possibilities that the [G]uarantee
[C]lause offered, and he circulated the Holtzoff Memoranda to the Vice
Ultimately, President Roosevelt
President and other Senate leaders.
proposed no action against Long under the [G]uarantee [C]lause, in part
because of the perceived constitutional ambiguities noted in Holtzoff's
memoranda, but even more so because of the apparent lack of congressional
support for any large scale federal involvement directed at such a popular
national figure. Congressional support obviously was essential to pass any
[G]uarantee [CIlause based legislation. Most important, however, was
Long's assassination in September 1935, which momentarily obviated the
need to rely on novel theories of constitutional power.
Kurland, supra n. 5, at 448-49.
372. Minor v. Happersett,88 U.S. 162, 171 (1874).
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within Congress's power to alter state voter qualifications.3 73 Since
Congress had not acted to give women the franchise, the states
disqualifying women would still be presumed republican within the
meaning of the Guarantee Clause. Nonetheless, the Court did not
suggest that it would violate state sovereignty for Congress to impose
national voter qualification standards upon the states under the Clause.
The Court ignored its commitment to nonjusticiability, but still gave
Congress broad discretion to act under the Clause.
Coyle v. Smith did indeed limit this discretion to matters that can
3 74
genuinely bear some substantial relation to republican government.
Coyle struck a congressional act that curtailed Oklahoma's freedom to
pick a site for its capital city. 3 75 The Court again notes that the
Guarantee Clause "impose[s] upon Congress the duty of seeing that [a
state's republican] ...form [of government] is not changed to one antirepublican." 376 But, under Coyle, the Clause "obviously [did] not
confer [a] power" upon the Congress to determine where Oklahoma
should site its capital.3 77 Although some have made much of this
decision to show that the Guarantee Clause is fundamentally limited by
state power, Coyle's holding is quite narrow, since Congress made no
effort to show that its action was inspired by the protection of a
republican form of government. 37 8 In any case, it is not very easy to
see how such a justification would make sense. Republicanism, as was
shown in Part II, is quite flexible, but it does not keep us so openminded that our brains fall out.
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon,3 79 which
adhered more faithfully to Luther's nonjusticiability theory, also
upheld the powers granted to Congress. 38 Recognizing that Congress
had already spoken about the republican nature of the referendum by
admitting Oklahoma in 1907 with its constitutional provisions for
Progressive institutional reforms, the Court refused to place its

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at 177.
221 U.S. 559, 567-68 (1911).
Id.
at 579.
Id. at 567-68.
Id. at 568.
Merritt, supra n.5,at 74-75.
223 U.S. 118 (1912).

380. Id.at 151.
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38 1
thoughts about republicanism in conflict with those of Congress.
Though its logic seemed more concerned with avoiding "strange, farreaching, and injurious results," the Court nonetheless recruited a form
of institutional competence argument to arm Congress with both the
sword and shield in the battle to protect republican principles. 38 2 An
effective Congress may often protect the rights of states to organize
themselves in variegated ways, but it is within the discretion of
Congress to determine when a state ceases to be "substantially"
383
republican enough, triggering a need for federal legislation.
Finally, even Baker v. Carr,3 84 which limits Luther's
nonjusticiability thesis to only those cases in which political questions
arise, can be said to reaffirm Luther's delegation of some of the
Guarantee Clause powers to the Congress. By emphasizing the
political question doctrine-coherent or not-Brennan keeps alive the

381. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 266.
382. P. Sts. Tel. & Telegraph, 223 U.S. at 142.
383. Barsky v. U.S., 167 F.2d 241, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Kurland provides a
summary of this extension:
In 1938, as part of the reaction to the Communist "Red Scare," Congress
established the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of
Representatives (HUAC). The constitutionality of the formation of HUAC
was challenged in Barsky v. United States. In Barsky, the defendant was
convicted for willful failure to produce records pursuant to a subpoena issued
by HUAC. The defendant contended that the establishment of HUAC
violated the first amendment.
In affirming the conviction, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
devoted most of its time addressing the scope of the congressional power of
inquiry and investigation. However, the court of appeals also appeared to
reach the merits of the scope of congressional authority under the
[G]uarantee [C]lause, explicitly holding:
Congress is charged with part of the responsibility imposed upon the
federal government by that clause of the Constitution which provides
that "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government." Art. 4, § 4. This Clause alone would
supply the authority for congressional inquiry into potential threats to
the republican forms of the governments of the States.
There was no discussion of Luther v. Borden or the political question
doctrine. Thus, although congressional power to investigate is analytically
distinct from congressional power to legislate, Barsky represents one (albeit
analytically unsatisfying) example of where a federal court not only reached
the merits of a [G]uarantee [C]lause claim that called into question
congressional authority under the clause, but sanctioned broad prospective
use of the clause as well.
Kurland, supra n. 5, at 449-50.
384. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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limitation of Guarantee Clause interpretation to the Congress. Brennan
stays committed to the proposition that "[G]uarantee [C]lause claims
are nonjusticiable only because they present elements of a political
question and not
because they touch on matters of state governmental
' 3 85
organization.
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Baker directly questions the
Court's abdication of authority to Congress with regard to the
Guarantee Clause. He writes, "[t]he statements in Luther v. Borden,
that th[e] guaranty is enforceable only by Congress or the Chief
Executive is not maintainable. ' ' 386 Particularly countenancing the
voting rights he argues are afforded by the Guarantee Clause, Douglas
is quite right to find in this arena a role for the judicial function when
presented with Guarantee Clause claims from the populace. He cites
Woodbury's dissent in Luther for the proposition that as a general
matter judges should have a say in what republicanism requires
alongside Congress's pronouncements. 3 87 Of course, this position,
though scaling back from Luther's grant of exclusive power to the
political branches, is an argument for a concurrent power for the
judiciary, not a blunting of Congress's sword altogether. Just what
judicial standards a Court might find in the Guarantee Clause extends
beyond this article-but Baker still provides a sheath for 3 88a
congressional sword. Even Justice Stevens' dissent in Bush v. Gore
claims that "in the rare case in which a State's 'manner' of making and
construing laws might implicate a [violation of the guarantee of a
republican form of government], Congress, not this Court,
is likely the
' 3 89
constraint.
that
enforce
to
entity
proper governmental
B. RECENT SWINGS OF THE SWORD

As it turns out, however, the "sleeping giant" isn't completely
dormant, and has come out of hibernation, if only intermittently and
briefly. These moments of use suggest that the sword may be worth
wielding in the contexts suggested in Part IV.

385. Wiceck, supra n. 6, at 279 (emphasis added).
386. Baker, 369 U.S. at 244 n. 2 (Douglas, J., concurring).
387. Id.
388. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
389. Id. at 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Ohio v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565,
569 (1916); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1,42 (1849)).
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Adam Kurland published an article in 1989,390 finding the
Guarantee Clause useful for conferring jurisdiction in a set of laws
dealing with corruption. Because corruption of government seems
neatly to violate the demands of a republican form of government,
Kurland argues that Congress should act under the authority of its1
39
responsibility to guarantee republican forms of government.
Responding to the prosecution of governmental officials under the
jurisdictional limitations imposed by the Commerce Clause and Postal
Power, 392 drawn upon in RICO and other corruption laws, 393 Kurland
advocates use of the Guarantee Clause power by the Congress for help
in circumventing what was producing anomalous jurisdictional
results. 394 He concluded:
[T]hat the Guarantee Clause provides an independent
constitutional basis for Congress to legislate against state and local
official corruption ....
In addition, the Guarantee Clause gives
Congress the authority to establish a broad uniform
federal
395
standard of accountability for state and local officials.
Commentators have not more than passingly noticed his argument. I
think it is only a modest measurement and that the Clause sanctions
much more.
Indeed, Congress has in fact enacted criminal statutes, using the
Guarantee Clause as a constitutional basis. 396 For example, in Title
397
VII of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
"Congress found that possession of firearms by the various classes of
persons created [inter alia] a threat to the guarantee of republican
399
government." 398 And the Supreme Court, in United States v. Bass,
"seemed to concede guardedly that the Guarantee Clause was a
legitimate source of constitutional power under which Congress could

390. Kurland, supra n. 5.
391. Id. at 375-76.
392. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 7.
393. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000).

394. See Kurland, supra n. 5, at 371.
395. Id. at 375.
396. E.g. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711-3797o (2000); Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
397. Id. Is this how I get around Lopez?
398. Kurland, supra n. 5, at 451.
399. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
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legislate." 40 0 This decision, in conjunction with Kurland's article has
prompted some notable members of Congress to flex some Guarantee
Clause muscle, 401 even though the4ower has yet to garner broad
support as a basis to pass legislation.
This article has been an attempt to urge congressional action
under the Clause. Were the Supreme Court to find the Clause
justiciable thereafter-and I suspect it would-at least it would need to
delineate the contours of a new power with a jurisprudence that is
likely not as constrained by federalist concerns as have been the
Commerce and Section Five Enforcement Clauses since Lopez and
Boerne.
VII. CONCLUSION

Perhaps John Adams was
,, right that •"there
403 is not in lexicography a
more fraudulent word" than republicanism.
And Wiecek may be
right that "it is unsafe to generalize about the precise meaning of the
term" beyond "the negative senses of 'republican,' that is
nonmonarchical and nonaristocratic" forms of government (and it isn't
even clear that that is safe either). 4 04 But I suspect that Madison wrote
into the Constitution a bit more when he recommended that the United
States shall guarantee to every state in the union a republican form of
government. He writes: "It is of great importance in a republic not
only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to
40 5
guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part."
This goal of republican society can only be attained according to
Madison "by comprehending in the society so many separate
descriptions of citizens."406 By breaking society into "so many parts,

400. Kurland, supra n. 5, at 451-52. Ultimately, the Act was repealed but for reasons
unrelated to the Guarantee Clause. E.g. 131 Cong. Rec. S23 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985).
401. See e.g. 134 Cong. Rec. 33,296 (1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers); 133 Cong.
Rec. 32,959-61 (1987) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
402. But cf 28 U.S.C. §1738C (2000); Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); H.R.
Rpt. 104-664 (July 9, 1996) (where Congress has recently called upon a different part
of Article IV, recruiting § I to claim their power to pass the Defense of Marriage Act).
403. Wiecek, supra n. 6, at 13 (citing John Adams, A Defense of the Constitutions of
Government in the United States of America 160-61 (Da Capo Press 1971).
404. Id. at 17.
405. James Madison, The FederalistNo. LI, supra n. 19, vol. I, 353, 356.
406. Id.
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interests and classes of citizens," 40 7 Madison hopes that pluralism and
contestation will combine to safeguard against regression out of a
republican form of government. Of course, the possibility for a
regression is precisely what the Guarantee Clause is aimed at
protecting against, and precisely why there is a federal power for the
guarantee.
Unfortunately, as I have shown here, commentators of both
republicanism and the Guarantee Clause share a similar fixation. Both
neo-republican legal scholars, as well as scholars wanting to make use
of the Guarantee Clause, are consumed with the judiciary. To be sure,
both have good reasons for resting their hopes with independent
judges. Nevertheless, as a matter of normative political theory,
republicanism has much to recommend to legislators; it can serve as a
basis to enact legislation that the Court has adjudged is beyond the
authority vested by the Commerce and Section Five Enforcement
Clauses. Moreover, as a matter of practical politics, the struggle for the
justiciability of the Guarantee Clause proceeds at a snail's pace, if it
can even be said to be progressing at all. Therefore, this article
recommends that Congress act under a power that even the Supreme
Court has suggested rests with it.
When Congress does enact legislation under the authority of the
Clause, lawyers can of course expect the Court to devise standards of
judicial review. And such a reaction would be completely appropriate:
"[I]t would be only performing its usual function of keeping the
legislature within those powers actually conferred., 418 Yet, the
Court's precedent will necessarily limit its ability to insist on the
rigorous neo-federalist standards it has recently been propounding.
Since Congress-by taking responsibility for the guarantee-will be
heeding the Court's own advice, the Court should find itself in a bind; a
bind from which they will hardly need Houdini to escape. They will
simply grant what many lawyers have been arguing for decades, that
the Clause raises justiciable questions after all. We may not like the
jurisprudence we get as a result, but it will have to be more deferential
than the Commerce Clause and Enforcement Clause jurisprudences

407. Id. at 357.
408. Bonfield, Desuetude, supra n. 5, at 565.
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have become in the wake of neo-federalism. Perhaps they will grant
what Sumner already knew in 1865:
Words receive expansion and elevation with time. Our fathers
builded [sic] wiser than they knew. Did they simply mean a
guarantee against a king? Something more I believe-all of which
was not fully revealed to themselves, but which we must now
declare in light of our institutions. We know more than
Montesquieu on the question. The time has come to fix a meaning
on these words ....

My point is that liberty, equality before the

law, and the consent of4 09
the governed are essential elements of a
republican government.
But let us not be too optimistic. After all, I'm just scheming here.

409. Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner vol. IV, 258-59 (Amo
Press 1969) (letter from Sumner to Francis Lieber, dated Oct. 3, 1865).
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